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ABSTRACT 
The development of the diesel engine in the human life 
has a positive impact for transportation and industries. Behind 
the development of diesel engines which quite rapidly, the 
diesel engines also have a negative effect, air pollution. 
Therefore actions to reduce the air pollution are needed. One of 
the actions is by using the alternative energy, natural gas. The 
use of natural gas as a fuel in the vessel can be done for new 
ships or ships that already exist. However, the use of natural 
gas is certainly provide a different construction with oil-fueled 
ships in their system, which is certainly a risk that can be 
generated from it. The risk can be analyzed in two perspectives, 
frequency and severity. There are three main step framework 
of risk assessment which must to fulfill, there are Risk 
Identification, Risk Analysis and Risk Evaluation. Risk 
identification which using HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) 
method, do by understanding function of all system which will 
be analyze. Risk analysis is step to determine level of frequency 
and consequence which will be used as an input for the risk 
evaluation. The risk evaluation is step for determining if the 
risk is acceptable or tolerable. If there are ‘not acceptable’ risk 
than action should be taken to reduce the risk level or 
mitigation by using LOPA (Layers of Protection Analysis) 
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method. From 41 failure mode scenarios there are 18 failure 
mode which has moderate risk level and 1 failure mode on high 
risk level, rest of failure mode scenario has low risk level. Due 
to several risk with high consequence category, then the 
operational of dual fuel must always monitored, to support the 
monitoring activity a good and reliable items are needed. There 
for the activity of inspection and maintenance for those items 
are need to be done periodically.  
Keyword: Dual Fuel, Ferry Ship, Fuel System, HAZOP, 
LNG, LOPA, Risk Assessment. 
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ABSTRAK 
Perkembangan mesin diesel selama ini memiliki 
dampak yang positif bagi kehidupan manusia baik digunakan 
disarana trasnportasi maupun indusrti. Namun tidak hanya 
dampak postif saja, terdapat dampak negatif yeng diberikan 
oleh penggunaan mesin diesel, seperti pencemaran udara. Salah 
satu cara untuk menanggulanginya adalah dengan 
menggunakan energi alternatif, seperti gas alam (natural gas). 
Penggunaan gas alam sebagai bahan bakar dapat diterapkan 
pada kapal baru maupun kapal yang sudah beroperasi. Untuk 
kapal yang sudah beroperasi maka perlu dilakukan perubahan 
atau modifikasi pada sistem bahan bakarnya. Perbedaan sistem 
bahan bakar natural gas dengan sistem bahan bakar pada mesin 
diesel konvensional tentunya memberikan resiko tertentu yang 
dapat merugikan secara material ataupun keselamatan. Resiko 
dapat dianalisa dengan melihat dua faktor yaitu frekuensi dan 
kosekuensi, dimana tingkat resiko akan terlihat dari hasil 
perkalian antara frekuensi dan konsekuensi. Terdapat tiga 
langkah utama dalam penilaian suatu resiko yaitu 
pengidentifikasian resiko, analisa resiko dan evaluasi. 
Identifikasi resiko yang menggunakan metode HAZOP 
(Hazard and Operability) dilakukan dengan memahami fungsi 
dari sistem yang akan dianalisa, hasilnya berupa skenario mode 
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kegagalan pada sistem tersebut. Tahap berikutnya adalah 
analisa resiko dimana pada tahap ini akan menentukan tingkat 
frekuensi dan konsekuensinya. Evaluasi resiko adalah tahap 
untuk menetukan tingkat dari resiko tersebut apakah resiko 
tersebut berada dalam katagori acceptable atau not acceptable. 
Jika ada suatu resiko yang menunjukan not acceptable maka 
perlu dilakukan tindakan pencegahan atau mitigasi dengan 
meggunakan metode LOPA (Layers of Protection Analysis). 
Dari 41 mode kegagalan 18 diantaranya berada pada tingkat 
resiko moderate dan 1 pada tingkat resiko high, sementara 
sisanya berada pada tingkat resiko low. Mengacu pada 
beberapa resiko yang memiliki tingkat konsekuensi yang 
tinggi, maka operaisonal pada sistem bahan bakar dual fuel 
haruslah selalu terawasi, untuk menunjang hal tersebut 
diperlukan alat-alat yang baik dan handal. Oleh karena itu 
adanya aktivitas inspeksi and perawatan secara berkala 
sangatlah direkomendasikan. 
Kata kunci: Dual Fuel, HAZOP, Kapal Feri, LNG, LOPA, 
Peniliaian Resiko, Sistem Bahan Bakar.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background  
 
The development of the diesel engine in the human life has a 
positive impact for transportation and industries. Behind the 
development of diesel engines which quite rapidly, the diesel 
engines also have a negative effect, air pollution. Air pollution 
comes from the remnants of diesel engine combustion 
pollutants which containing elements such as Nitrogen Oxides 
(NOx), sulfur oxides (SOx), Carbon Monoxide (CO) and 
hydrocarbons (HC). 
Using fuel oil as energy supply on the ship’s engine has 
increasingly high which led to increasing numbers of air 
pollution. Therefore actions to reduce the air pollution are 
needed. One of the actions that have been carried out is the 
imposition of ECAs which is the rule in certain areas that limit 
the contents of air pollutants, such as those already mentioned. 
Moreover, the use of alternative energy, natural gas, is also one 
way to reduce air pollution in the sea. Natural gas which still 
abundant in this country is expected to be utilized properly as 
an alternative energy.  
The use of natural gas as fuel on the ship have also increased 
over time. The price of natural gas relative to that of diesel or 
gasoline can vary widely from time to time and from one 
location to another. Generally, on an energy basis, natural gas 
and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) sell significantly cheaper 
than diesel fuel and gasoline. In this case the use of natural gas 
as a fuel will provide economic benefits for the ship company 
because it can be save the cost for fuel consumption. 
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The use of natural gas as a fuel in the vessel can be done for 
new ships or ships that already exist. However, the use of 
natural gas is certainly provide a different construction with oil-
fueled ships in their system, which is certainly a risk that can 
be generated from it. Every dangers and risks that posed can 
cause damage on their equipment, economic losses and may 
harm to the people around it. From the existing problems, there 
are should be a study for the risks that can be posed, it aims to 
reduce or eliminate them. 
The risk can be analyzed in two perspectives, likelihood and 
severity, where the amount of the risk is determined by 
multiplying the value of likelihood and severity. In this thesis 
will discuss about all the risks and impacts that may be caused 
on the ship that use natural gas as a fuel. 
1.2. Problem Formulation and Scope 
 
The use of natural gas as the main fuel in vessels has begun to 
used. This is have several positive effect to the environmental 
if compared to fuel oil, which contained elements of exhaust 
gases such as Nitrogen Oxides (NOx), Sulfur Oxides (SOx), 
hydrocarbons (HC), Carbon Monoxide (CO) more higher then 
natural gas, it is no wonder if many ships start switch to using 
natural gas as its primary fuel. However, the use of natural gas 
caused ship to pick different design of the fuel system. 
Obviously this distinction has a different risk and impact on 
their system. Therefore, risk assessment on fuel system for the 
ships which using natural gas as fuel are required to avoid 
system failures that can harm to people around it. 
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Based on the description above, presented several problems: 
1. What are the risks and failures that can be generated on the 
fuel system that uses natural gas as fuel?  
2. How is the risk level of danger posed from each of the 
existing failure? 
3. How to minimize failure and risk on fuel system?  
Scope of Problems: 
1. The ship that will be reviewed is the ferry ship that use 
natural gas as fuel (dual-fuel). 
2. Data that are not listed in detail, such as P&ID, will be 
assumed to follow project guide from the machine 
manufacture and class regulation which used by ship. 
3. Human factor on every failure modes will be ignored. 
 
1.3. Objective 
 
The objectives of this Thesis are: 
1. Knowing the risks and failures that can be generated on a 
fuel system that uses natural gas as fuel. 
2. Knowing the risk level of danger that can be generated 
from existing failure. 
3. To obtain a way to minimize the failure and risk. 
 
1.4. Benefit 
 
The final results of this Thesis is the form of safety 
recommendations for the ferries that use natural gas as fuel. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Natural Gas  
 
Natural gas is usually the volatile portion of crude petroleum. 
It normally occupies under high pressure the porous rocks of 
oil reservoirs above the liquid fuel zone. The gas is similarly 
found in dry structure or non-associated with oil gas fields. At 
first, when the prime target was the creation of oil, the gas was 
by and large saw as an aggravation and was frequently wasted 
and flared off. Lamentably, some huge measures of gas are as 
yet being flared when the gas can't be adequately used 
privately, pumped once more into wells to upgrade oil 
recuperation, or transported to potential markets by means of 
pipelines over long separations. 
Natural gas has been known since ancient times, mainly 
through its fires following its ignition when it escaped through 
fractures and fissures in the earth. Its industrial exploitation 
began mainly in the 19th century. It was used initially for street 
lighting and domestic heating.  
Rapid progress has been made worldwide in recent years in the 
discovery of new natural gas deposits and its transportation 
over the globe, both as a gas and in its cryogenic liquid state, 
liquefied natural gas (LNG). Its increased availability, the need 
to meet increasingly lower emission controls, and its relatively 
low cost have tended to increase its usage as a fuel in a wide 
variety of applications. The gas has been increasingly viewed 
as a premium fuel that is in much demand, and may well be for 
quite some time in the future a prime source of usable fuel 
energy. (Karim, Dual Fuel Diesel Engine, 2015) 
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2.1.1. Natural Gas as Fuel 
 
Utilizing characteristic gas as fuel on ship have effectively 
demonstrated to decreasing the emanation of fumes gas, 
however it could degrade the engine power and performance. 
There are a few approach to utilizing characteristic gas as fuel, 
there are: 
- Use existing diesel engines (Dual fuel engines) 
- Natural gas engines 
 
Utilizing existing diesel motors just appears to be applicable 
for retrofit ventures. These are not so likely to occur for LNG 
projects due to other requirements for the fuel systems. Indeed, 
studies of existing ships in comparable services show little 
improvement with regards to emissions, except for particulates. 
Diesel engines will run fine on natural gas – however the 
environmental benefits are not so obvious. Some methane will 
pass unburned through the engine (methane slip) contributing 
to the total greenhouse gas emissions. It will be required to mix 
an amount of diesel with the gas and the gas must be injected 
at a high-pressure. 
Dual-fuel (DF) engines run on gas with 1% diesel (gas mode) 
or alternatively on diesel (diesel mode); Combustion of gas and 
air mixture in Otto cycle, triggered by pilot diesel injection (gas 
mode), or alternatively combustion of diesel and air mixture in 
Diesel cycle (diesel mode); Low-pressure gas admission. 
(Lauridsen, et al., 2010) 
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Figure 1 Combustion on Dual Fuel Engine 
Natural gas engines or spark-ignition gas (SG) engines run only 
on gas by combustion of gas and air mixture in an Otto cycle, 
triggered by spark plug ignition. The engines use low-pressure 
gas admission. 
There are four main manufactures of technology that can be 
used for natural gas powered ships. These four engine 
manufactures includes Rolls-Royce, GE, Wärtsilä and MAN 
Diesel. 
 
2.2. Modes Operation of Gas-Fueled Engines 
 
The premixed dual-fuel engine is basically a conventional 
compression ignition engine of the diesel type where the 
injection of some liquid fuel, often in quite small dosages, is 
used to provide the source for ignition. The cylinder charge is 
made up mainly of lean mixtures of a gaseous fuel and air. 
There are a number of variations of this mode of operation, 
such as having the gaseous fuel injected at very high supply 
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pressures directly into the engine cylinder so that the fuel burns 
into the wake of the earlier injected and already ignited liquid 
fuel jet. (Karim, Dual Fuel Diesel Engine, 2015) 
 
Figure 2 Schematic representation of a premixed dual-fuel engine with 
diesel injection to serve as the pilot for ignition (left). Schematic 
representation of a dual-fuel engine where the fuel gas is injected directly 
into the chamber and ignition is obtained with pilot fuel injection (right). 
Normally in dual-fuel engine applications, mainly for 
economic reasons, much of the energy release comes from the 
combustion of the usually cheaper gaseous fuel, while only a 
small amount of diesel liquid fuel is injected to provide ignition 
through timed cylinder injection in the usual way as takes place 
in conventional diesel engines. Such an operation, with 
optimum conversion methods, has been shown to have the 
potential to provide operational characteristics that are often 
comparable or even superior to those of conventional liquid-
fueled diesel or gas-fueled spark ignition engines. This may be 
achieved while displaying improved emission characteristics 
and quiet, smooth, and improved low-ambient-temperature 
operation with reduced thermal loading. Such superior 
performance may be achieved only when sufficiently effective 
measures are ensured, such as, for example, the avoidance of 
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knock at high loads and the excessively incomplete gaseous 
fuel utilization at relatively light loads. Usually, a main aim 
while retaining alternatively acceptable diesel operation is to 
maximize the replacement of the diesel fuel by a usually 
cheaper and more abundant gaseous fuel while maintaining 
acceptable levels of exhaust emissions and engine 
performance. (Karim, Dual Fuel Diesel Engine, 2015) 
 
2.3. Structure and Component on Dual Fuel System 
 
The general arrangement of the gas fuel system is shown in 
figure below. Explanation of the different systems is given in 
the following sections. 
 
Figure 3 Ship Natural Gas Fuel System 
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Figure 4 Structure LNG Fuel System by using Pump 
Source: Wärtsilä 
 
Figure 5 Structure LNG Fuel System by using PBE 
Source: Wärtsilä 
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Components: 
 Double skinned tank type-C 
 Ventilation Fan 
 Cool Box 
 Pressure Buildup Evaporator (PBE) or Pump 
 Vaporizer (Heat Exchanger) 
 Gas Valve Unit 
 Inert gas 
 Master Gas Valve 
 Gas Filter 
 
 
Figure 6 Vent Outlet on Main Engine  
Source: Wärtsilä 
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Figure 7 Double wall gas manifold and venting valve on Main Engine 
Source: Wärtsilä 
 
 
Figure 8 Gas Fuel System on Main Engine 
Source: Wärtsilä 
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Figure 9 Pilot Fuel System on Main Engine 
Source: Wärtsilä 
 
 
Figure 10 Pilot Fuel System on Main Engine 
Source: Wärtsilä 
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The factors to be considered during ship design are (Society for 
Gas as a Marine Fuel, 2014): 
 Protection 
Protection of the LNG storage tank and LNG/ gas pipework 
from damage through collisions with other vessels and/or 
cargo or by dropped objects. 
 
 Redundancy 
Redundancy of fuel systems to ensure that the vessel can 
continue to navigate if one system is damaged or fails. 
 
 Minimization 
Minimization of any hazards provided by the use of gas as 
fuel. 
 
 Safety 
Safety systems that provide a safe shutdown of hazardous 
systems and removal of their inventories to prevent the 
build-up of potentially explosive atmosphere. 
 
2.4. Specific Requirements for Ships Using Natural Gas as 
Fuel 
 
Specific Requirements for ships which using natural gas as fuel 
are following requirements from Annex XI and IMO: 
International Code for Safety of Ships or Other Gases Using 
Low-Flashpoint Fuels (IGF Code). The basic requirement is the 
prevention from formation of an explosive atmosphere. The 
design principle for explosion protection is the application of a 
double barrier between the fuel gas and the environment. The 
space between the first and the second barrier is defined as 
15 
 
 
 
explosion hazardous zone. The space outside of the second 
barrier is defined as a gas safe area. (MAN B&W, 2015) 
 
To realize this, there are the following two possibilities: 
▪ Double walled piping or 
▪ Single walled piping installed in a separate compartment 
The space between the first and second barrier could be realized 
as follows: 
▪ Gas monitoring and venting of the space or 
▪ Gas tight space, monitored and filled with over pressurized 
inert gas 
 
The protection and certification requirements on components 
used in explosion hazardous areas are related to the explosion 
hazardous zones in which they are used. The definitions 
according to IEC 60079-10: 2008 are: 
 
Zone 0 : area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is present 
continuously or is present for long periods. 
Zone 1 : area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is likely to 
occur in normal operation. 
Zone 2 : area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is not 
likely to occur in normal operation and, if it does occur, 
is likely to do so only infrequently and will exist for a 
short period only. 
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Figure 11 Example of Hazardous area on Engine Room 
Source: MAN B&W 
2.4.1. Gas Fuel Storage 
 
Fuel tank technology is also available providing several options 
of fuel tank types. These tanks are double-wall for providing 
efficient insulation in different ways. LNG is stored in the tanks 
as a ‘boiling cryogen’ which is a very cold liquid at its boiling 
point. However, as efficient as the tank may be, it will not keep 
the LNG cold enough to remain liquid by itself. As heat is 
transferred, the pressure in the tank rises as LNG starts 
evaporating. Under this condition, the gas that boils off needs 
to be released from the tank in order to control the pressure 
rates within the tank. As LNG evaporation cannot be reduced, 
specialized pressurized tanks can be used to store LNG fuel in 
order to minimize the need for venting as they can withstand a 
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higher internal pressure and thus increase the time between 
venting events. However, for the LNG fuelled vessels, where 
LNG is steadily being withdrawn from the tank to power the 
engines the pressure can be kept below the venting threshold 
and actually avoid the need of gases to be released. (Lowell, 
Wang, & Lutsey, 2013) 
 
The boil off gases can likewise be re-liquefied and come back 
to the tank or to be utilized for the auxiliary engines. Refer to 
(Würsig, 2013) there are two ways to divide tank type. The first 
one is according to their shape and then based on their location. 
The LNG tanks can be located either on the deck or in a tank 
room within the ship. The most common fuel tank is cylindrical 
with vacuum insulation. 
 
The current administrative methodology depends on self-
supporting tanks as characterized in the IMO IGC code: type A 
(designed as ship structures) and type B (prismatic or spherical) 
tanks are generally feasible for fuel gas tanks but their 
requirement for pressure maintenance and secondary barrier 
raise problems which have not yet been solved in a technically 
and commercially sound way. This may be a future solution for 
ships carrying large amounts of LNG as fuel. Hence IMO type 
C tanks (pressure vessels) turn out to be the preferred solution 
for current designs. (Boulougouris & Chrysinas, 2015) 
 
In this point, it can be examined the second way of division 
between tank types as it is obvious below. As a result according 
to this second way, there are two types of gas storage tanks on 
the vessel: 
 The Membrane Tanks 
 The Independent Tanks 
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2.4.1.1. Membrane Tanks 
 
Membrane tanks use the available space efficiently but require 
a secondary barrier in the event of a gas leak. Furthermore, they 
are reinforced with a nitrogen system and a gas detector for 
each separate insulated space. (American Bureau of Shipping, 
2011) 
 
 
Figure 12 Membrane Tank 
Source: ABS 
2.4.1.2. Independent Tanks 
 
There are three types of independent tanks: 
 Type A 
 Type B 
 Type C (pressurized tanks) 
 
The usage of this type of tanks is suitable for higher volumes 
of LNG. It is an atmospheric tank which is adjustable to hull 
shape and it is space efficient. However, it is not common to be 
used by LNG fuelled vessels as Type A tanks require a full 
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secondary barrier to prevent potential release of the liquefied 
gas in the event of a tank failure. Another obstacle is also the 
price of Type A tanks that is very high. (American Bureau of 
Shipping, 2011) 
 
For high capacity, appropriate Type B independent tanks are 
required. According to the IGC Code, the tank must be 
arranged so that it can be possible to provide compressed inert 
gas to have a secondary barrier and provide adequate protection 
to the steel in case of gas leak. The pressurized inert gas 
consists of dry air and the inert gas filling. (Würsig, 2013) 
 
Refer to (Würsig, 2013), the independent tanks type C is the 
most common, as mentioned earlier, because they are 
manufactured for low capacity. Their main characteristic is the 
high pressure gas, approximately 5 bar, and a maximum 
allowable working pressure of 20 bar. This allows the provision 
of directly on machines, without having gone through pumps. 
 
2.4.1.3. LNG Tank Location 
 
There are two conceivable outcomes, above or below deck, the 
above deck location is less mind boggling and less costly. The 
below deck location requires zoned division from different 
spaces, explosion proof appliance, devoted ventilation system, 
in general, more controls. LNG tank storage cannot be placed 
where MDO can be stored (wing tanks, DB’s) and thus the 
volume requirements are many times that of storing MDO. On 
the other hand, above deck locations, well away from the 
vessels roll and pitch centers, invite greater sloshing and 
possibly greater structural weight in the installation.  
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Figure 13 LNG Tank Location above the Deck 
Source: Wärtsilä 
 
 
Figure 14 LNG Tank Location below the Deck 
 Source: Wärtsilä 
 
The tanks that will be installed on open deck have the following 
limitations. (American Bureau of Shipping, 2011) 
 Have B/5 distance from the hull as mentioned earlier. In 
ships not carrying passengers, the tanks can be placed 
closer to the edge of the deck. This depends on the volume 
of the tank and ranged from 0.8-2.0 m but never less than 
800mm. 
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 To be located in a place where there is adequate natural 
ventilation. 
 
Τhe tanks to be installed indoors must follow the following 
rules (American Bureau of Shipping, 2011): 
 Maximum air pressure 10 bar 
 Be located within B / 5 or 11.5 m from the hull. 
 Have B/15 distance or 2 m from the bottom. In ships not 
carrying passengers, the tanks can be placed closer to the 
edge of the deck. This depends on the volume of the tank 
and ranged from 0.8-2.0m but never less than 800mm. 
 
2.4.1.4. Management of Boil off Gas (BOG) 
 
A critical aspect of controlling methane leak emissions is the 
management of boil-off gas (BOG) from the cryogenically 
cooled liquefied natural gas. At atmospheric pressure, natural 
gas must be maintained at a temperature below –162°C in order 
to stay in a liquid state. It is therefore stored and transported 
throughout the supply chain in specially designed, well-
insulated containers. No matter how well insulated, however, 
some heat will continually seep into the container. As heat is 
absorbed, the head space pressure inside the container rises as 
LNG evaporates. The rate at which LNG evaporates depends 
on the size of the tank and the materials and methods of 
construction. (Boulougouris & Chrysinas, 2015) 
 
LNG capacity tanks are intended to vent some of the vaporized 
gas when the internal tank pressure rises above a set threshold. 
Many LNG storage tanks are designed to function in range 
close to atmospheric pressure, and they generally vent when the 
internal tank pressure rises above approximately 10 pounds per 
square inch gauge, or psig (0.7 bar). If LNG must be stored for 
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long periods, a pressurized Type C tank may be used to extend 
the amount of time without resorting to venting. The use of a 
pressurized tank does not reduce the LNG evaporation rate, but 
it increases the time between venting events because it can 
withstand a higher internal pressure. (Harperscheidt, 2011) 
 
There are four main methods for dealing with the BOG created 
during LNG storage and handling: (1) releasing it to the 
atmosphere; (2) flaring it; (3) capturing it for use as gaseous 
fuel, or (4) capturing and reliquefying it. Capture of BOG can 
take a number of forms. For marine vessels that store LNG 
onboard for their own propulsion, BOG is continually being 
created in the fuel tanks as heat is absorbed, but liquid and 
vapors are also steadily being withdrawn from the tank to 
power the engines. 
 
2.4.1.5. Filling Limits 
 
Other than the way that LNG tanks require additional volume 
because of low density of LNG and the tank’s shape and 
insulation, some tank volume is required to be reserved for 
LNG expansion and for residual LNG (heel) in the empty tank 
to keep it cold. The tank’s relief valve pressure drives the limit 
placed on the loading level. The reason for this is that LNG’s 
density decreases quickly as heat is absorbed, and its 
temperature and saturation pressure increase. The higher the 
temperature (and corresponding saturation pressure), the lower 
the density. 
 
Current IMO regulations limit LNG tanks to 98% full at the 
relief valve setting where it is the maximum allowable volume. 
Loading a tank with LNG at -162oC, when it is close to 
atmospheric pressure, is the desirable loading condition 
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because at that condition LNG can remain in the tank for the 
longest period of time before heat absorption raises the tank 
pressure to the relief valve setting. At this initial loading 
condition, the LNG density will be at its highest value. 
(Harperscheidt, 2011) 
 
 
Figure 15 Loading limits for a range of relief valve pressure 
Source: Bunkering, Infrastructure, Storage and Processing LNG,  
 
Since the mass of LNG remains the same as the pressure is 
building and the LNG density is going down (raising the level 
in the LNG tank), the ratio of the densities between the LNG 
when bunkered and when at the 98% full limit determines the 
loading limit (the level the tank can be loaded while 
bunkering). 
 
The higher the relief valve pressure the lower the loading limit, 
but on the other hand, the higher the relief valve pressure, the 
longer the LNG can stay in the tank. Besides the limit on filling, 
usable tank capacity is further reduced by the common practice 
of leaving LNG in the bottom 5% of the tank volume to 
continue boiling off, keeping the tank cold until the next 
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bunkering. Cooling down an empty, warm tank before it can be 
refilled with LNG takes a long time and is normally avoided. 
 
The bottom line is that usable capacity of LNG in a Type C 
pressure tank is only about 80% to 85% of its available volume, 
depending on the relief valve setting. All range calculations for 
the vessel should be based on the usable capacity and not the 
highest filling or loading limits. Except from the naval 
architecture perspective, there is much to learn when 
considering the use of LNG as ship’s fuel, particularly those 
related to LNG fuel storage. Engine selection, bunkering, 
maintenance, operation, and training also need to be considered 
and each adds to the complexity of the switch to LNG fuel. 
(Harperscheidt, 2011) 
 
2.4.2. Engine Room 
 
The engine room is considered as a gas safe area due to the 
complete double wall fuel gas piping system on the engine and 
in the engine room. Additionally each engine room must be 
equipped with at least two intrinsically safe certified gas 
sensors of continuous monitoring type. One intrinsically safe 
certified gas sensor in the ventilation outlet and one 
intrinsically safe certified gas sensor above each DF engine. 
The detection equipment shall be located where gas may 
accumulate. The number of detectors could depend on size, 
layout and ventilation of the engine room, and has to be agreed 
by the classification society. (Wärtsilä, 2014) 
 
2.4.3. Gas Fuel Piping on the Engine 
 
The fuel gas supplied to the engine is provided to the cylinders 
individually through the gas admission valves mounted in the 
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air inlet manifold of each cylinder. The gas admission valves 
are controlled individually by the speed governor in order to 
regulate the engine power and speed through controlling the 
amount of fuel gas fed to each cylinder. (Wärtsilä, 2014) 
 
The design of the gas admission valves and piping ensures that 
under normal conditions, only air and not fuel gas is contained 
in the charge air manifold. The gas admission valves are 
actuated (opened) through solenoids and are closed through 
springs (normally closed type). 
 
2.4.4. Gas Fuel Piping Between GVU Room and Engine 
 
Before the gas is supplied to the engine it passes through a Gas 
Valve Unit (GVU). The GVU include a gas pressure control 
valve and a series of block and bleed valves to ensure reliable 
and safe operation on gas. The pipe between the gas valve unit 
(GVU) room and the engine is a double walled pipe, also the 
compensator used to connect the engine is double walled. The 
space in between the inner and outer pipe of the double walled 
pipe is continuously ventilated by 30 air changes per hour. 
(MAN B&W, 2015) 
 
The piping is designed to withstand an internal explosion 
without being untight. A non-dangerous deformation of the 
components is permissible. Ductile material has to be used. 
Therefore, piping with pressure rating PN40 (40 bar), valves 
with pressure rating PN25 (25 bar) and compensators with 
pressure rating PN10 (10 bar) are used. In a gas line with 5 bar 
operation pressure, the maximum explosion pressure for 
Methane is 36 bar. (MAN B&W, 2015) 
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The unit includes a manual shut-off valve, inerting connection, 
filter, fuel gas pressure control valve, shutoff valves, 
ventilating valves, pressure transmitters/gauges, a gas 
temperature transmitter and control cabinets. The filter is a full 
flow unit preventing impurities from entering the engine fuel 
gas system. The fineness of the filter is 5 μm absolute mesh 
size.  (Wärtsilä, 2014) 
 
The pressure drop over the filter is monitored and an alarm is 
activated when pressure drop is above permitted value due to 
dirty filter. The fuel gas pressure control valve adjusts the gas 
feed pressure to the engine according to engine load. The 
pressure control valve is controlled by the engine control 
system. The system is designed to get the correct fuel gas 
pressure to the engine common rail pipe at all times. Readings 
from sensors on the GVU as well as opening and closing of 
valves on the gas valve unit are electronically or electro-
pneumatically controlled by the GVU control system. All 
readings from sensors and valve statuses can be read from 
Local Display Unit (LDU). The LDU is mounted on control 
cabinet of the GVU. (Wärtsilä, 2014) 
 
2.4.5. Gas Valve Unit 
 
The fuel gas pressure supplied to the dual-fuel engine is 
regulated and controlled individually by one gas valve unit 
(GVU) for each dual-fuel engine. The GVU has to be protected 
against excessive inlet overpressure by an external safety valve 
(to be mounted upstream of the shut-off valve, e.g. downstream 
of the gas compressor). 
 
The gas valve unit has the following functions: 
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 Gas leakage test through engine control systems before 
engine start. 
 Control of gas feed pressure to dual-fuel engine. 
 At the end of gas operation, the unit shuts off the gas 
supply. 
 Shut-off of the fuel gas supply in case of emergency stop. 
 Automatic purging of gas distribution after DF operation 
incl. emergency stop with inert gas. 
 Purging for maintenance reasons with inert gas. 
 
If the engine is not in operation, the manual gas shut-off valve 
at the inlet of the GVU, or another shut-off valve nearby 
upstream of the GVU, has to be closed. There must not be any 
gas present downstream of the manual shut-off valve of the 
GVU if the engine is not in operation. (Wärtsilä, 2014) 
 
Installation of GVU (Wärtsilä, 2014): 
 Installation of gas valve unit in dedicated compartment 
(GVU room) with gas-tight walls. 
 Single wall gas pipes and instrumentation in the gas valve 
unit room. 
 The gas valve unit room has to be ventilated by 30 air 
changes per hour. The ventilation system of the GVU room 
consists of exhaust ventilators installed in a dedicated 
exhaust air duct. Ventilation air for the GVU room will be 
sucked in from outside and will also come from the engine 
room via the double wall pipe. Therefore, the air pressure 
in the GVU room has to be constantly lower than the air 
pressure in the engine room. The difference of pressure has 
to be monitored. 
 The volume of the gas valve unit room has to be as small 
as possible. Maintenance work must be possible. 
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 The GVU room has to be monitored by at least one 
intrinsically safe certified gas sensor. The exact number of 
gas sensors to be agreed with the authority and according 
to the room geometry. 
 A gas overpressure safety valve has to be installed 
upstream of the GVU. 
 
2.4.6. Ventilation 
 
Rooms and spaces to be ventilated for gas leakage fighting 
reasons: 
 GVU room 
 Space between the double wall gas pipes 
 
Technical requirements of the ventilation (Wärtsilä, 2014): 
 The complete design of the ventilation system for a gas 
engine driven new building has to be in accordance with 
applicable marine rules (IGF Code and IGC Code etc.) and 
approved by the marine classification society. 
 The design of the ventilation is in general a mechanical 
forced ventilation system. 
 Ventilation air is taken from free atmosphere and gas safe 
area via ducting. 
 Ventilation inlet and outlet duct have to be equipped with 
automatically closing fire louvers and are mechanically 
protected by screens with not more than 13 mm square 
mesh. 
 Ventilation capacity: For hazardous areas min. 30 air 
changes per hour. Monitoring of the suction with alarm 
below 30 air changes per hour. 
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 This ventilation capacity may be reduced to 10 air changes 
per hour provided automatic filling of the duct with 
nitrogen upon detection of gas is arranged for. 
 Indication and alarming of loss of ventilation capacity in 
engine control station. 
 Ventilation system independent from other ventilation 
systems. 
 Independent systems for each engine room. Each GVU 
room will be forced exhaust ventilated. 
 Ventilation is in operation even under shutdown 
conditions. 
 Ventilation fans have to be approved for ventilating 
explosive atmosphere. 
 Ventilation air outlet kept away from ignition sources. 
 Inlet and outlet equipped with closing arrangement 
(louvers) in case of fire in engine or GVU room. 
 
2.4.7. Gas Detectors 
 
The project related requirements have to be in accordance with 
applicable marine rules (IGF Code and IGC Code etc.) and 
approved by the marine classification society. 
 
General requirements: 
 Each engine room must be equipped with at least two 
intrinsically safe certified gas sensors of continuous 
monitoring type. One intrinsically safe certified gas sensor 
in ventilation outlet and one intrinsically safe certified gas 
sensor above each DF engine, where gas may accumulate. 
 The GVU room ventilation outlet must be monitored at 
least by additional one intrinsically safe certified gas 
sensor. 
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 Gas sensors are to be connected to a common alarm system 
with audible and visible alarms. 
 Gas sensors have to be of intrinsically-safe and certified 
type and have to be type approved by IACS classification 
societies. 
 Two independent, continuous working, fixed gas 
monitoring systems in operation when gas fuel is in piping 
or during purging. 
 Gas detection requirements: Self-monitoring. 
 Self-detection of system: Malfunction shall not lead to 
false emergency shutdown of the engine. 
 Functional redundancy when either one of the systems 
fails. 
 System designed to be readily tested. 
 
2.5. Risk Assessment 
 
Risk assessment can be facilitated through several formal 
techniques. These different methods may contain comparable 
ways to deal with answer the basic risk assessment questions; 
however, a few methods might be more fitting than others for 
risk analysis depending on the situation. 
Risk assessment techniques develop processes for identifying 
risk on the system, it will divided into two general categories: 
induction and deduction. 
Induction provides the reasoning of a general conclusion from 
individual cases. Inductive analysis answers the question, 
“what are the system state(s) due to some event?” In reliability 
and risk studies this “event” is often some fault in the system. 
Deductive approaches provide reasoning for a specific 
conclusion from general conditions. This technique attempts to 
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recognize what methods of a framework/subsystem failure can 
be used to contribute to the failure of the system. Deductive 
logic answers the question, “how can a system state occur?”. 
(Wilcox, Burrows, Ghosh, & Ayyub, 2000) 
 
2.5.1. HAZOP Method 
 
Hazard and Operability or HAZOP is an analysis technique 
which used to exam safety factor on new system or 
modification to knowing the potential failure on their 
operability. The HAZOP study should preferably be carried out 
as early in the design phase as possible - to have influence on 
the design. 
Refer to HAZOP studies – Application guide (Norhayati, 
2001), HAZOP may also be used more extensively, including: 
 At the initial concept stage when design drawings are 
available. 
 When the final piping and instrumentation diagrams 
(P&ID) are available. 
 During construction and installation to ensure that 
recommendations are implemented. 
 During commissioning. 
 During operation to ensure that plant emergency and 
operating procedures are regularly reviewed and updated 
as required. 
 
The basis of HAZOP is a “guide word examination” which is a 
conscious quest for deviations from the design intent. To 
encourage the examination, a framework is partitioned into 
parts in the design intent for every part can be sufficiently 
characterize. The size of the part chosen is likely to depend on 
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the complexity of the system and the severity of the hazard. In 
complex frameworks or those which show a high risk the parts 
are prone to be small. 
The design intent for a given part of a framework is expressed 
regarding elements which pass on the essential features of the 
part and which represent natural divisions of the part. The 
selection of elements to be analyzed is to some degree a 
subjective choice in that there might be several combinations 
which will accomplish the required reason and the decision 
may also depend upon the particular application. Elements may 
be discrete steps or stages in a procedure, individual signals and 
equipment items in a control system, equipment or components 
in a process or electronic system, and so forth. (Norhayati, 
2001) 
The identification of deviations from the design intent is 
achieved by a questioning process using predetermined “guide 
words”. The role of the guide word is to stimulate imaginative 
thinking, to focus the study and elicit ideas and discussion, 
thereby maximizing the chances of study completeness. 
Table 1 Basic Guide Words and Meanings 
Guide Word Meaning 
NO or NOT Complete negation of the design intent 
MORE Quantitative increase 
LESS Quantitative decrease 
AS WELL AS Qualitative modification/ increase 
PART OF Qualitative modification/ decrease 
REVERSE Logical opposite of the design intent 
OTHER THAN Complete substitution 
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Table 2 Guide Words relating to Clock Time and Order or Sequence 
Guide Word Meaning 
EARLY Relative to the clock time 
LATE Relative to the clock time 
BEFORE Relating to order and sequence 
AFTER Relating to order and sequence 
 
Some examples of combinations of guide-words and 
parameters: 
 NO FLOW 
Wrong flow path - blockage - incorrect slip plate – 
incorrectly fitted return valve - burst pipe - large leak - 
equipment failure- incorrect pressure differential - isolation 
in error. 
 
 MORE FLOW 
Increase pumping capacity - increased suction pressure - 
reduced delivery head - greater fluid density - exchanger 
tube leaks - cross connection of systems - control faults. 
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Figure 16 Flow chart of the HAZOP examination procedure – Element first sequence 
Source: HAZOP Studies – Application Guide 
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A worksheet to record the results of examinations and follow-
up should be produced or received. Despite the reporting choice 
received, the worksheet ought to contain the fundamental 
components to suit specific requirements. The layout of the 
worksheet will vary depending upon whether it is a part of a 
manual or computerized reporting program. The manually 
completed form will normally consist of a header and columns. 
The header may contain the following information: project, 
subject of the study, design intent, part of the system being 
examined, members of the team, drawing or document being 
examined, date, page number, etc. 
The headings (titles) of the columns may be as follows: 
 for those completed during the examination: 
o reference number; 
o element; 
o guide word; 
o deviation; 
o cause; 
o consequences; 
o action required. 
 
Additional information such as safeguards, severity, comments 
and risk ranking may also be recorded. 
 for those completed during the follow-up: 
o recommended action; 
o priority/risk ranking; 
o responsibility for action; 
o status; 
o comments. 
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  Figure 17 HAZOP Worksheet BS IEC 61882 
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Refer to (Rausand, 2005) the description of content on the 
Figure 17, are: 
 Design Intent 
The design intent is a description of how the process is 
expected to behave at the node; this is qualitatively 
described as an activity (e.g., feed, reaction, sedimentation) 
and/or quantitatively in the process parameters, like 
temperature, flow rate, pressure, composition, etc. 
 
 Deviation 
A deviation is a way in which the process conditions may 
depart from their design/process intent. 
 
 Parameter 
The relevant parameter for the condition(s) of the process 
(e.g. pressure, temperature, composition). 
 
 Guideword 
A short word to create the imagination of a deviation of the 
design/process intent. The most commonly used set of 
guide-words is: no, more, less, as well as, part of, other 
than, and reverse. In addition, guidewords like too early, 
too late, instead of, are used; the latter mainly for batch-
like processes. The guidewords are applied, in turn, to all 
the parameters, in order to identify unexpected and yet 
credible deviations from the design/process intent. 
 
 Cause 
The reason(s) why the deviation could occur. Several 
causes may be identified for one deviation. It is often 
recommended to start with the causes that may result in the 
worst possible consequence. 
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 Consequence 
The results of the deviation, in case it occurs. 
Consequences may both comprise process hazards and 
operability problems, like plant shut-down or reduced 
quality of the product. Several consequences may follow 
from one cause and, in turn, one consequence can have 
several causes 
 
 Safeguard 
Facilities that help to reduce the occurrence frequency of 
the deviation or to mitigate its consequences. There are, in 
principle, five types of safeguards that: 
1. Identify the deviation (e.g., detectors and alarms, and 
human operator detection) 
2. Compensate for the deviation (e.g., an automatic 
control system that reduces the feed to a vessel in case 
of overfilling it. These are usually an integrated part of 
the process control) 
3. Prevent the deviation from occurring (e.g., an inert gas 
blancket in storages of flammable substances) 
4. Prevent further escalation of the deviation (e.g., by 
(total) trip of the activity. These facilities are often 
interlocked with several units in the process, often 
controlled by computers) 
5. Relieve the process from the hazardous deviation (e.g., 
pressure safety valves (PSV) and vent systems) 
 
2.5.2. Risk Evaluation 
 
The risk evaluation is represented by the achievement of a 
synthetic level of risk, which is the “magnitude of a risk or 
combination of risks, expressed in terms of the combination of 
consequences and their likelihood”. This level of risk should be 
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compared with risk criteria for determining if the risk is 
acceptable or tolerable. Evaluating risks is important for 
determining priorities for the implementation of risk control 
measures. The risk rating is a combination of the frequency (F) 
and the likelihood of the incident occurring and the severity of 
the possible consequences (C). (ISO (Intenational Organization 
for Standardization), 2009) 
On evaluate risk, there is a point which must know to determine 
criteria for the risk. This is will be a reference to know the 
criteria of the risk, tolerable, intolerable or ALARP (As Low 
As Reasonably Practicable). There for it will be need a standard 
as a reference to determine their criteria, some standard well 
most known are DNV-GL, NASA, US Coast Guard, US 
Department of Defense, UK HSE, IMO, etc. There are also 
several standard which made by company for their risk 
evaluation. For risk evaluation on this Bachelor Thesis will be 
use risk matrix from MICOPERI Marine Contractors which has 
applied on risk assessment of LNG Marine Fuel by Mystic 
River Partners LLC (LNG Marine Operation Consultants). 
 
 
Figure 18 MICOPERI Risk Matrix 
1 2 3 4 5
Very Unlikely Unlikely Possible Likely Frequent
1 Minor 1 2 3 4 5
2 Moderate 2 4 6 8 10
3 Significant 3 6 9 12 15
4 Serious 4 8 12 16 20
5 Catastrophic 5 10 15 20 25
S
E
V
E
R
I
T
Y
MICOPERI                                     
Risk Matrix
PROBABILITY
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Table 3 Severity Description 
Rank Description 
1 Minor: Minor injury/ no internal disruption. 
2 
Moderate: Injury which requires medical attention/ 
minor internal disruption. 
3 
Significant: Potentially life threatening injury 
causing temporary disability and/or requiring 
medevac/ disruption possibly requiring corrective 
action. 
4 
Serious: Major life threatening injury or causing 
permanent disability/ incomplete recovery/ pollution 
with significant impact/ very serious disruption 
which may cause performance degraded.  
5 
Catastrophic: Fatality or multiple fatalities or 
multiple life threatening injuries causing permanent 
disabilities/ total loss. 
 
 
Table 4 Probability Description 
Rank Description Probability 
1 
Very Unlikely: Could only occur 
under a freak combination of factors. 
< 10-5 
2 
Unlikely: May occur only in 
exceptional circumstances. 
10-5 – 10-4 
3 Possible: Could occur at some time. 10-4 – 10-2 
4 
Likely: Would not require 
extraordinary factors to occur at some 
time. 
10-2 – 10-1 
5 
Frequent: Almost certain to happen if 
conditions remain unchanged. 
10-1 – 1 
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Where: 
1-2 : Low risk area, the potential hazards are under control. 
3-8 : Moderate risk area, there is the need to verify that the 
potential hazards are under control and improve the 
measures already adopted. 
9-15 : Medium risk area, there is the need to identify and 
schedule protection and prevention measures to be 
adopted in order to reduce or the probability P or the 
potential damage S. 
16-25 : High risk area, there is the need to identify and 
schedule protection and prevention measures to be 
adopted in order to reduce the probability of the 
potential hazard (they shall be considered as urgent). 
 
2.5.3. Frequency and Consequence Analysis 
 
Frequency analysis involves estimating the likelihood of 
occurrence of each failure case. There are several main 
approaches to estimating frequencies: 
 Historical accident frequency data. This uses previous 
experience of accidents. It is a simple approach, relatively 
easy to understand, but is only applicable to existing 
technology with significant experience of accidents and 
where appropriate records have been kept. 
 
 Fault tree analysis. This involves breaking down an 
accident into its component causes, including human error, 
and estimating the frequency of each component from a 
combination of generic historical data and informed 
judgment. 
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 Event tree analysis. This is a means of showing the way an 
accident may develop from an initiating event through 
several branches to one of several possible outcomes. The 
technique is usually used to extend the initiating event 
frequency estimated by one of the above means into a 
failure case frequency suitable for combining with the 
consequence models. 
Frequencies are simply calculated by combining accident 
experience and population exposure, typically measured in 
terms of installation-years: 
Event frequency per installation per year 
=
Number of Instalation x Years of Exposure
Number of Events
 
 
A prime source of data for frequency analysis on this Bachelor 
Thesis is the Offshore and Onshore Reliability Data (OREDA). 
The data from OREDA are used  as value of basic event for 
FTA. 
 
Figure 19 Example Data Record from OREDA 2002 
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Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is an analysis technique that models 
possible combinations among system elements, such as 
equipment failures, human errors, and external events and 
conditions leading to specific accidents. The FTA technique 
relies on the backward search method employing logic tree 
(Boolean logic) of the relationships. The technique shows how 
hazard events can occur through the escalation of a single or a 
combination of a wide range of latent initiating events. It also 
shows the safeguards in place and how they can fail to prevent 
escalation of events. The FTA technique is applicable for any 
risk analysis, but it is used most effectively to analyses 
accidents or problems that are characterized by a large number 
and complex combinations of events. It can be used as a tool to 
understand causal factors and determine actual root causes of 
accidents. (Mullai, 2006) 
 
The tree structure is deemed sufficient to demonstrate the ways 
in which events arise. A list of recommendations is also 
developed for managing risks. The main elements most 
commonly used to construct a fault tree are (Mullai, 2006): 
 The top event is the one that is analyzed, which is 
represented by a rectangle; 
 Intermediate events are system states or occurrences that 
contribute to the accident, which are represented by 
rectangles; 
 Basic events are the lowest levels of resolution in the fault 
tree, which are represented by circles; 
 Undeveloped events are those that are not further 
developed in the fault tree, which are represented by 
diamonds; 
 “AND” gates - the output event associated with this gate 
exists only if all of the input events exist simultaneously; 
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 “OR” gates - the output event associated with this gate 
exists if at least one of the input events exists. 
 
 
Figure 20 Steps in Fault Tree Analysis 
 
1. Identify undesirable top event. 
2. Link contributors to top event by logic gates (Example 
shape of AND Gate). 
3. Identify first level contributors. 
4. Link second level contributors to top by logic gates 
(Example shape of OR Gate) 
5. Basic event. 
 
OR Gate, either of two independent element failures produces 
system failure. 
 
RT = RARB 
PF = 1 – RT 
PF = 1 – (RARB) 
PF = 1- [(1-PA) (1-PB)]  
PF = PA + PB - PAPB 
45 
 
 
 
 
P + R = 1  
R = e-𝜆T  
P = 1- e-𝜆T 
 
R: Reliability 
P: Failure Probability 
𝜆: Failure Rate 
T: Exposure Interval 
 
 
Figure 21 Propagation through OR Gate 
Source: Fault Tree Analysis, 4th Edition 
 
AND Gate, both of two independent elements must fail to 
produce system failure. 
 
RT = RA + RB - RARB 
PF = 1 – RT 
PF = 1 – (RA + RB - RARB) 
PF = 1- [(1-PA) + (1-PB) - (1-PA) (1-PB)]  
PF = PAPB 
 
P + R = 1  
R = e-𝜆T  
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P = 1- e-𝜆T 
 
R: Reliability 
P: Failure Probability 
𝜆: Failure Rate 
T: Exposure Interval 
 
 
Figure 22 Propagation through AND Gate 
Source: Fault Tree Analysis, 4th Edition 
 
Estimation of the consequences of each failure case is 
necessary to complete the analysis of the risks. The approach 
usually differs for each type of hazard. For this Bachelor 
Thesis, consequence analysis will be use ALOHA software to 
determine consequence which could be arise from all hazard.  
 
2.5.4. Mitigation 
 
If there are any unacceptable risk on the scenario, then those 
risk will be analysis for mitigation act to reduce the risk. 
Mitigation analysis method for this Bachelor Thesis is Layers 
of Protection Analysis. 
Layers of protection analysis (LOPA) is a semi-quantitative 
methodology that can be used to identify safeguards that meet 
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the independent protection layer (IPL). The IPL is capable of 
detecting and preventing or mitigating the consequences of 
specified, potentially hazardous event(s), such as a runaway 
reaction, loss of containment, or an explosion. An IPL is 
independent of all the other protection layers associated with 
the identified potentially hazardous event. Independence 
requires that the performance is not affected by the failure of 
another protection layer or by the conditions that caused 
another protection layer to fail. Most importantly, the 
protection layer is independent of the initiating cause. The 
protection provided by the IPL reduces the identified risk by a 
known and specified amount (Summers, 2002). 
2.6. Previous Research 
  
The Previous Research about safety assessment of fuel system 
on dual fuel engine of ship had been done by: 
1. Wilcox, Robb. Burrows, Mark. Ghosh, Sujit. Ayyub, Bilal. 
“Risk-based Technology Methodology for the Safety 
Assessment of Marine Compressed Natural Gas Fuel 
Systems”, International Cooperation on Marine 
Engineering System/ The Society of Naval Architects and 
Marine Engineers, pp. 1-21, New York, May, 2000 
 
The research has focus to determine design safety for novel 
marine on a CNG fuel system on the KINGS POINTER 
training vessel by using Risk-based technologies (RBT) which 
provide techniques to facilitate the proactive evaluation of 
system safety through risk assessment, risk control, risk 
management, and risk communication. RBT techniques offer a 
proactive means for safety management through the 
identification of hazards and reducing associated risks through 
risk control measures. These tools provide a formal and 
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systematic way to address safety for novel designs when 
existing standards are not available to provide safety guidance. 
Design acceptance should be determined based on system 
design to adequate levels of safety, which may be qualitatively 
identified in a risk matrix and/or design guidelines. 
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CHAPTER III          
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
In order to solve the problem above, that will be used data 
analysis from literatures. 
1. Background. 
Before conducting the research, first will be explained 
the background of this study. 
 
2. Study of literature. 
The study of literature is an early stage is the stage of 
learning about the basic theories to be discussed or 
used in the thesis. Source taken at this stage comes 
from books, papers, websites, journals, and so forth. 
 
3. Data collection. 
This phase is to obtain information about the ships that 
use gas fuel and learn the workings of their systems. 
 
4. Identify Function, Requirements and Specification. 
Identify and understand the process steps and their 
functions, requirements, and specifications that are 
within the scope of the analysis. The goal in this phase 
is to clarify the design intent or purpose of the process. 
This step leads quite naturally to the identification of 
potential failure modes. 
 
5. Risk Identification (HAZOP) 
Potential cause of failure describes how a process 
failure could occur, in terms of something that can be 
controlled or corrected. The goal is to describe the 
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direct relationship that exists between the cause and 
resulting process failure mode. 
 
6. Frequency Analysis and Consequence Analysis 
Analysis of the data in order to determine the levels of 
risk. By using FTA for frequency analysis and 
ALOHA for consequence analysis.  
 
7. Risk Evaluation. 
This stage will be determined whether the risks are 
acceptable or not, the decisions are made based on Risk 
Matrix from MICOPERI Marine Contractors. 
  
8. Mitigation 
If there are any intolerable risk after the risk evaluation, 
then will be do a mitigation act to minimize those risk 
by using LOPA method. 
 
9. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Make conclusions based on the results obtained and 
suggestions for further research development. 
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CHAPTER IV                            
DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
4.1. Data Analyze 
 
On this chapter will be discussed further on about all data that 
required. Analyze data will be appropriated to the scope of 
problems which had determined.  
4.1.1. Ships data 
 
Viking Grace, Ro-Pax ferry, 2013 
 4 x Wärtsilä 8L50DF Engines 
 Wärtsilä LNGPac 
 2 x Wärtsilä Built-up Propellers 
 Wärtsilä Transverse Thrusters 
 Wärtsilä Seals & Bearings 
 
Figure 23 Viking Grace 
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Figure 24 General Arrangement of Viking Grace 
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Table 5 Ship's Data 
Name Viking Grace 
Type Ro-Pax Cruise Ferry 
Length Overall 218,21 m 
Breadth Extreme 32,42 m 
Gross Tonnage 57565 GT 
Deadweight 6107 t 
Service Speed 22 knots 
Main Engine 4x8L50DF 7600 kW 
Generator Set 4x6L50DF 5700kW 
Route Turku-Mariehamn-Stockholm 
IMO 9606900 
Owner Viking Line Abp, Finland 
Shipyard STX Europe in Turku, Finland 
Flag Finland (FI) 
Class Lloyd’s Register 
Delivered 2013 
Capacity 2800 passengers 
Crew 200 
 
Table 6 LNGPac Data 
Type LNGPac 200 
Geometric volume (m3) 200 
Net volume (90%) (m3) 180 
Diameter (m) 4,3 
Tank length (m) 19,1 
Tank room (m) 2,7 
Total length (m) 21,8 
LNGPac empty weight (ton) 77 
Tank full weight (ton) 163,4 
 
56 
 
 
 
Table 7 Chemical properties 
Type LNG 
Physical state at 15o C and 1 atm Gas 
Boiling point at 1 atm -161oC 
Freezing point -182,2oC 
Critical temperature -82,2oC 
Critical pressure 45,78 atm 
Specific gravity (liquid) 0,415-0,45 at -162oC 
Vapor (gas) specific gravity 0,55-1 
 
The complete physical and chemical properties for liquefied 
natural gas has attached on Attachmnet I. 
Table 8 Ship's timetables  
Source: https://www.sales.vikingline.com/en/find-cruise-
trip/timetable/turku-stockholm/ 
Turku  Mariehamn  Stockholm 
08.45 > 14.10-14.25 > 18.55 
19.50 < 14.10-14.25 < 07.45 
 
 
Figure 25 Ship's Route 
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Figure 26 Weather condition 13th Aug 2015 at Latitude 60,08 Longitude 
21,09 (Ship's route Turku-Mariehamn)  
Source:http://www.worldweatheronline.com/v2/historical-
weather.aspx?q=60.0812835408536,21.09375 
The risk assessment on this Bachelor Thesis will be done to the 
weather condition of summer season (13th August 2015) with 
ship’s route Turku-Mariehamn which located at Lat. 60,08 and 
Lon 21,09. This condition has be adapted with ship voyage 
schedule, could be seen on Figure 26 with red box. 
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4.1.2. P&ID of Fuel System 
 
P&ID which will be used to analyze the problems will be 
appropriated to the scope of problems of this Thesis, there are:  
 P&ID of Gas Storage and Supply System 
 P&ID of Gas Valve Unit (GVU) 
 P&ID of Internal fuel gas system 
 
Figure 27 LNG Fuel System Arrangement 
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Figure 28 P&ID of Cool Box System (PBU-1) 
Unit Components: 
 
LT : LNG Tank 
SAV : Solenoid Actuator Valve 
PBE : Pressure Build-Up Evaporator 
MGE : Main Gas Evaporator 
E : Evaporator 
 
Sensors and Indicators: 
 
P : Pressure Transmitter 
T : Temperature Sensor 
 
Pipe Connection: 
 
A1 : Gas Outlet to GVU (5-10 bar) 
 
60 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29 Auxiliary System (Heat Exchanger) (AXME-1) 
Unit Components: 
 
HE : Heat exchanger 
SAV : Solenoid Actuator Valve 
PHE : Centrifugal pump 
 
Sensors and Indicators: 
 
FMHE : Flow meter 
THE : Temperature Sensor 
 
To/ From E-01 From PBE-01/ To MGE -01 
To/ From LT Water System To/ From HVAC 
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Figure 30 P&ID of Gas Valve Unit (GVU-1) 
Unit Components: 
 
VSO : Manual Shut off Valve 
VNR : Non-Return Valve (Left to Right) 
VV : Vent Valve 
VB : Block Valve 
VI : Inerting valve 
VG : Gas Control Valve 
PR : Pressure Regulator 
B-01 : Gas Filter 
B-02 : Inert Gas Filter 
B0-3 : Control Air Filter 
CV  : Solenoid Valve 
 
Sensors and Indicators: 
 
P-01 : Pressure Transmitter Gas Inlet 
P-02 : Pressure Transmitter Gas Inlet 
P-03 : Pressure Transmitter 
P-04 : Pressure Transmitter Gas Outlet 
P-05 : Pressure Transmitter Inert Gas 
P-06 : Pressure Transmitter Control Air 
P-07 : Pressure Difference Transmitter 
T : Temperature Sensor 
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Pipe Connection: 
 
A1 : Gas Inlet (5-10 bar) 
B1 : Gas Outlet to Main Engine 
C1 : Gas Venting 
D1 : Inert Gas (Max 15 bar) 
E1 : Instrument Air (6-8 bar) 
 
Figure 31 P&ID of Internal fuel gas system (FGS-1) 
Unit Components: 
 
FL : Gas Safety Filter 
GAV : Gas Admission Valve 
C : Cylinder 
VV : Venting Valve 
 
Sensors and Indicators: 
 
GP : Gas Pressure Indicator 
 
Pipe Connection: 
 
B1 : Gas Inlet from Main Engine  
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4.1.3. Mode Operation 
 
For mode operation on fuel system of dual fuel ship, there are 
three main mode, normal operation, tank pressure increase and 
bunkering procedure.  
 
Figure 32 Bunkering Procedure 
Source: Wärtsilä 
Bunkering Procedure 
1. Check that on board bunkering line is inerted and 
cooled down. 
2. Collapse the gas pressure in the tank. 
3. Open the main filling line. 
4. Close the filling line valves. 
5. Inert the piping with N2.  
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Figure 33 Tank Pressure Increase 
Source: Wärtsilä 
Tank Pressure Increase 
1. Open pressure control valve. 
2. LNG flow by the hydrostatic pressure into the 
vaporizer. 
3. LNG is vaporized and gas is returned to the tank 
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Figure 34 Normal Operation 
Source: Wärtsilä 
Normal Operation 
1. The ‘master gas valve’ is opened (pneumatic actuated 
valve with manual override). 
2. LNG is forced by tank pressure through the product 
evaporator and instantly evaporated. 
3. Gas flows to the GVU. 
4.2. Risk Assessment 
 
There are three main step framework of risk assessment which 
must to fulfill, there are: 
 Risk identification is the “process of finding, recognizing 
and describing risks”, and involves “identification of risk 
sources, events, their causes and their potential 
consequences”; 
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 Risk analysis is the “process to comprehend the nature of 
risk and to determine the level of risk”; 
 Risk evaluation is the “process of comparing the results of 
risk analysis with risk criteria to determine whether the risk 
and/or its magnitude is acceptable or tolerable”. 
On this sub-chapter will be discuss the risk assessment for the 
Process on Pressure Build up Evaporator (PBE) based on P&ID 
of Cool Box system. For the others risk assessment has attached 
on Attachment II. 
4.2.1. Risk Identification 
 
The first step on risk assessment which have to be done is risk 
identification. Risk identification on this Bachelor Thesis do by 
understanding function of all system which will be analyze. 
The result from risk identification is scenario of all failure 
modes. Example of failure modes list on HAZOP worksheet 
could be seen on the Table 9, the complete worksheet has 
attached on Attachment II. 
For the example is the risk identification of Process on Pressure 
Build up Evaporator (PBE) which refer to P&ID of Cool Box 
System. The part of the system selected for examination is the 
line from the LNG tank with material as LNG liquid to the LNG 
tank as LNG vapor, this process has function to increase the 
pressure on the tank so the LNG liquid, which will being a 
vapor, will flow to the engine through the GVU system, as 
shown on Figure 35.  
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Figure 35 Example of risk identification on Process on Pressure Build up 
Evaporator (PBE) 
The next step is identify the element or material which flow on 
the process and determine the design intent. Then decide the 
Guide Word and Element for obtaining Deviation, as shown on 
the figure below. 
After obtaining Deviation, the next step is investigate cause, 
consequence and protection based on the system arrangement. 
For the consequence which has possibility of gas leakage or 
explosion will use ALOHA software. 
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Table 9 HAZOP Worksheet
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4.2.2. Risk Analysis 
 
After finished on risk identification step for all system, the next 
step is risk analysis to determine level of frequency and 
consequence which will be used as an input for the risk 
evaluation. For the example will be shown the risk analysis 
result from HAZOP of Process on Pressure Build up 
Evaporator (PBE). 
Frequency value for each causes are decided from FTA method 
which had explained on sub-chapter 2.5.3. Frequency and 
Consequence Analysis (Page: 45-50). For value of Basic Event 
are obtained from OREDA 2002. After obtained the value of 
Failure Rates and Probability of Failure, the value will be 
matched to Table of Probability Description (Page: 44). 
The FTA method will start from top event which refer to 
Possible Causes from HAZOP worksheet. For each causes will 
be given a code to simplify the process. For example, failure on 
SAV-04 Valve which cannot opened. 
A1 PBU 1.1.  
A : First level contributor (It will following alphabet for 
the next level) 
1 : First contributors (It will following numerical order 
for the next causes) 
PBU : System which have to identify from HAZOP 
Worksheet 
1 : Failure mode’s number, based on HAZOP worksheet 
1 : Potential cause order 
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Failure on SAV-04 valve (PBU 1.1.) 
A1: Loss of power 
A2: Fail to control valve 
B1: Breakdown 
B2: Fail to start on demand 
B3: Fail to synchronize 
B4: Low output 
B5: Spurious stop 
B6: Delay 
B7: Fail to open 
B8: Structural deficiency 
 
The value of each event are decided based on gate type. Failure 
Probability for Basic Event will obtained from Failure Rates 
value, explained on sub-chapter 2.5.3 Frequency and 
Consequence Analysis (Page: 48-50). For example of PBU 1.1. 
First calculate the value of each basic event: 
 B1 PBU 1.1. 
P = 1- e-𝜆T 
 
P: Failure Probability 
𝜆: Failure Rate (OREDA 2002: 13.2 x10-6) 
T: Exposure Interval (OREDA 2002: 0.2323) 
 
PB1 = 1- e
-(13.2 x10^-6) x0.2323= 3.06 x 10-6 
 B2 PBU 1.1. 
P = 1- e-𝜆T 
 
P: Failure Probability 
𝜆: Failure Rate (OREDA 2002: 8140.51 x10-3) 
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T: Exposure Interval (OREDA 2002: 0.2323) 
 
PB2 = 1- e
-(8140.51 x10^-6) x0.2323= 1.89 x 10-3 
 B3 PBU 1.1. 
P = 1- e-𝜆T 
 
P: Failure Probability 
𝜆: Failure Rate (OREDA 2002: 4.5 x10-6) 
T: Exposure Interval (OREDA 2002: 0.2323) 
 
PB3 = 1- e
-(4.5 x10^-6) x0.2323= 1.04 x 10-6 
 B4 PBU 1.1. 
P = 1- e-𝜆T 
 
P: Failure Probability 
𝜆: Failure Rate (OREDA 2002: 132.04 x10-6) 
T: Exposure Interval (OREDA 2002: 0.2323) 
 
PB4 = 1- e
-(132.04 x10^-6) x0.2323= 3.06 x 10-5 
 B5 PBU 1.1. 
P = 1- e-𝜆T 
 
P: Failure Probability 
𝜆: Failure Rate (OREDA 2002: 2911.25 x10-6) 
T: Exposure Interval (OREDA 2002: 0.2323) 
 
PB5 = 1- e
-(2911.25 x10^-6) x0.2323= 6.76 x 10-4 
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 B6 PBU 1.1. 
P = 1- e-𝜆T 
 
P: Failure Probability 
𝜆: Failure Rate (OREDA 2002: 0.21 x10-6) 
T: Exposure Interval (OREDA 2002: 6.3474) 
 
PB6 = 1- e
-(0.21 x10^-6) x6.3474= 1.33 x 10-6 
 B7 PBU 1.1. 
P = 1- e-𝜆T 
 
P: Failure Probability 
𝜆: Failure Rate (OREDA 2002: 3.98 x10-6) 
T: Exposure Interval (OREDA 2002: 6.3474) 
 
PB7 = 1- e
-(3.98 x10^-6) x6.3474= 2.52 x 10-5 
 B8 PBU 1.1. 
P = 1- e-𝜆T 
 
P: Failure Probability 
𝜆: Failure Rate (OREDA 2002: 0.3 x10-6) 
T: Exposure Interval (OREDA 2002: 6.3474) 
 
PB1 = 1- e
-(0.3 x10^-6) x6.3474= 1.9 x 10-6 
After finish with all basic event, then calculate the top event 
based on the gate. 
 
Because there is an OR Gate then, 
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PA1 = PB1 + PB2 + PB3 + PB4 + PB5 – PB1PB2 – PB1PB3 – PB1PB4 – 
PB1PB5 – PB2PB3 – PB2PB4 – PB2PB5 – PB3PB4 – PB3PB5 – PB4PB5 + 
PB1PB2PB3 + PB1PB2PB4 + PB1PB2PB5 + PB1PB3PB4 + PB1PB3PB35 + 
PB1PB4PB5 + PB2PB3PB4 + PB2PB3PB5 + PB2PB4PB5 + PB3PB4PB5 – 
PB1PB2PB3PB4 – PB1PB2PB3PB5 – PB1PB2PB4PB5 – PB1PB3PB4PB5 + 
PB1PB2PB3PB4PB5 
PA1 = (3.06 x 10
-6) + (1.89 x 10-3) + (1.04 x 10-6) + (3.06 x 10-
5) + (6.76 x 10-4) – (3.06 x 10-6)(1.89 x 10-3)  – (3.06 x 10-6) 
(1.04 x 10-6) – (3.06 x 10
-6)(3.06 x 10-5) – (3.06 x 10
-6)(6.76 x 
10-4) – (1.89 x 10
-3)(1.04 x 10-6) – (1.89 x 10
-3)(3.06 x 10-5) – 
(1.89 x 10-3)(6.76 x 10-4) – (1.04 x 10
-6)(3.06 x 10-5) – (1.04 x 
10-6)(6.76 x 10-4) – (3.06 x 10
-5)(6.76 x 10-4) + (3.06 x 10
-6) 
(1.89 x 10-3)(1.04 x 10-6) + (3.06 x 10
-6)(1.89 x 10-3) (3.06 x 10-
5) + (3.06 x 10-6)(1.89 x 10-3)(6.76 x 10-4) + (3.06 x 10
-6)(1.04 x 
10-6)(3.06 x 10-5) + (3.06 x 10
-6)(1.04 x 10-6)(6.76 x 10-4) + (3.06 
x 10-6)(3.06 x 10-5)(6.76 x 10-4) + (1.89 x 10
-3)(1.04 x 10-6) (3.06 
x 10-5) + (1.89 x 10
-3)(1.04 x 10-6)(6.76 x 10-4) + (1.89 x 10
-3) 
(3.06 x 10-5)(6.76 x 10-4) + (1.04 x 10
-6)(3.06 x 10-5)(6.76 x 10-
4) – (3.06 x 10
-6)(1.89 x 10-3)(1.04 x 10-6)(3.06 x 10-5) – (3.06 x 
10-6)(1.89 x 10-3)(1.04 x 10-6)(6.76 x 10-4) – (3.06 x 10
-6)(1.89 
x 10-3)(3.06 x 10-5)(6.76 x 10-4) – (3.06 x 10
-6)(1.04 x 10-6)(3.06 
x 10-5)(6.76 x 10-4) + (3.06 x 10
-6)(1.89 x 10-3)(1.04 x 10-6) (3.06 
x 10-5)(6.76 x 10-4) = 2.6 x 10-3 
PA2 = PB6 + PB7 + PB8 – PB6PB7 – PB6PB8 – PB7PB8 + PB6PB7PB8 
PA2 = (1.33 x 10
-6) + (2.52 x 10-5) + (1.9 x 10-6) – (1.33 x 10-6) 
(2.52 x 10-5) – (1.33 x 10
-6)(1.9 x 10-6) – (2.52 x 10
-5)(1.9 x 10-
6) + (1.33 x 10-6) (2.52 x 10-5)(1.9 x 10-6)= 2.84 x 10-5 
PF (PBU1.1.) = PA1 + PA2 – PA1PA2 
PF (PBU1.1.) = (2.6 x 10
-3) + (2.84 x 10-5) – (2.6 x 10-3) (2.84 x 10-
5) = 2.62 x 10-3 
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Failure on evaporate system (PBU 2.1.) 
A1: Failure on pump 
A2: Fail to regulate valve 
B1: Loss of power 
B2: Fail to start electric motor pump 
B3: Pump is broken 
C1: Breakdown 
C2: Fail to start on demand 
C3: Fail to synchronize 
C4: Low output 
C5: Spurious stop 
C6: Fail to start pump 
C7: Noise 
 
 
Leakage (PBU 3.1.) 
A1: Pipe being rupture 
A2: External leakage on valve 
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Fail to monitor pressure on the tank (PBU 4.1.) 
A1: Failure on pressure sensor 
A2: Loss of power 
B1: Breakdown 
B2: Fail to start on demand 
B3: Fail to synchronize 
B4: Low output 
B5: Spurious stop 
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Fail to close SAV-05 valve (PBU 4.2.) 
A1: Loss of power 
A2: Internal leakage on valve 
A3: Fail to control valve 
B1: Breakdown 
B2: Fail to start on demand 
B3: Fail to synchronize 
B4: Low output 
B5: Spurious stop 
B6: Delay 
B7: Fail to close 
B8: Structural deficiency 
 
After obtaining all the value of frequency the next step is 
determine the level of consequence, to determine it will be used 
table of Severity Description (Page 44). While for the 
consequence which generate an explosion or gas leakage will 
be used ALOHA software.  
ALOHA has function to knowing the area of an explosion or 
gas leakage based on chemical properties and environment 
condition. ALOHA result will be plotted to general 
arrangement drawing to knowing if there are any victim on that 
area or not. The complete result from ALOHA has attached on 
Attachment II. 
Because on HAZOP worksheet of Process on Pressure Build 
up Evaporator (PBE) there are consequence which has 
possibility to generate an explosion then ALOHA software will 
be used for consequence analysis. For the others consequence 
will be matched with the description from table of Severity 
Description. 
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Figure 36 Example of ALOHA (Threat Zone) 
 
Figure 37 Result of ALOHA (Threat Zone) on Ship's General Arrangement 
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4.2.3. Risk Evaluation 
 
For the risk evaluation will be give an example from failure 
mode Failure on SAV-04 Valve which cannot opened. Based 
on risk analysis, table of severity and table of probability these 
failure has a level of severity on 4 and level of probability on 
3. Those result will be plotted on risk matrix from MICOPERI 
Marine Contractors. 
 
Figure 38 Consequence from Failure on SAV-04 Valve 
 
Figure 39 Frequency from Failure on SAV-04 Valve 
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Table 10 Severity Description from Failure on SAV-04 Valve 
Rank Description 
1 Minor: Minor injury/ no internal disruption. 
2 
Moderate: Injury which requires medical attention/ 
minor internal disruption. 
3 
Significant: Potentially life threatening injury 
causing temporary disability and/or requiring 
medevac/ disruption which may cause performance 
degraded, possibly requiring corrective action. 
4 
Serious: Major life threatening injury or causing 
permanent disability/ incomplete recovery/ pollution 
with significant impact/ very serious disruption 
which may cause delayed on operational.  
5 
Catastrophic: Fatality or multiple fatalities or 
multiple life threatening injuries causing permanent 
disabilities/ total loss. 
 
Table 11 Probability Description from Failure on SAV-04 Valve 
Rank Description Probability 
1 
Very Unlikely: Could only occur 
under a freak combination of factors. 
< 10-5 
2 
Unlikely: May occur only in 
exceptional circumstances. 
10-5 – 10-4 
3 Possible: Could occur at some time. 10-4 – 10-2 
4 
Likely: Would not require 
extraordinary factors to occur at some 
time. 
10-2 – 10-1 
5 
Frequent: Almost certain to happen if 
conditions remain unchanged. 
10-1 – 1 
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Where: 
1-2 : Low risk area, the potential hazards are under control. 
3-8 : Moderate risk area, there is the need to verify that the 
potential hazards are under control and improve the 
measures already adopted. 
9-15 : Medium risk area, there is the need to identify and 
schedule protection and prevention measures to be 
adopted in order to reduce or the probability P or the 
potential damage S. 
16-25 : High risk area, there is the need to identify and 
schedule protection and prevention measures to be 
adopted in order to reduce the probability of the 
potential hazard (they shall be considered as urgent). 
The result from risk matrix shown that the Failure on SAV-04 
Valve which cannot opened has a level of risk on point 12. That 
is mean these failure shall be reduced. To reduce the risk level 
from these failure the mitigation will be applied, the mitigation 
will use LOPA method. 
Worksheet on the below shown the risk evaluation for Process 
on Pressure Build up Evaporator (PBE), for the others 
evaluation has attached on Attachment II.  
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Table 12 Result on HAZOP Worksheet
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4.3. Mitigation 
 
The result of Risk Evaluation, can be seen on HAZOP 
Worksheet, shown that some failure mode scenarios are on the 
Moderate rang High Risk level, there for needed action to 
reduce the risk level. Mitigation act is need to be done on those 
scenario where the risk need to identify and schedule protection 
and prevention measures to be adopted in order to reduce the 
frequency. 
Mitigation act on this Bachelor Thesis use LOPA Method. First 
step of LOPA method is re-write all failure scenario form 
HAZOP Worksheet, such as Consequence description, 
Consequence category, Risk tolerance criteria and Initiating 
event.  
The next step is adding all items that should be installed, those 
items are need to be installed to reduce the frequency of risk or 
could be used as early detection on failure case. Items which is 
installed on the system can be called IPL or Independent 
Protection Layer, for each IPL has a PFD (Potential Failure on 
Demand) value, these value can be obtained from OREDA 
database, OGP, etc. 
For the example of mitigation using LOPA method which refer 
from HAZOP Worksheet  could be seen on the Table 13, 
below, failure mode “No LNG transfer to tank caused by failure 
on SAV-04 Valve, fail to open”. 
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Table 13 LOPA Worksheet No LNG transfer to tank caused by failure on 
SAV-04 Valve, fail to open 
 
From the worksheet (Table 13) shown that frequency of 
mitigated consequence for failure mode No LNG transfer to 
tank caused by failure on SAV-04 Valve, fail to open has been 
reduce to 8.59 x 10-11, these result obtained from multiple of 
Frequency of unmitigated consequence with total PFD value 
of Independent Protection Layers. After that the final value of 
Frequency of mitigated consequence need to re-evaluation on 
risk matrix if the result on risk matrix shown on low risk level 
than the risk has been mitigate successfully. The result of risk 
matrix for failure mode No LNG transfer to tank caused by 
Scenario No. 1 Node No. 1
Date: 20 June 2016 Description Probability
Frequency 
(per year)
Consequence 
description/ Category
Operation of dual fuel system will 
be delayed/ 4
Risk Tolerance Criteria Action required >10-4
Tolerable <10-4
Initiating event
Failure on SAV-04 Valve, fail to 
open
2.62 x 10-3
Frequency of 
Unmitigated 
Consequence
2.62 x 10-3
Pressure transmitter 6.55 x 10-6
Low pressure alarm 5.01 x 10-3
Total PFD 3.28 x 10-8
Frequency of Mitigated 
Consequence
8.59 x 10-11
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
Met? (Yes/ No)
No LNG transfer to tank caused by failure on SAV-04 
Valve, fail to open
Independent Protection 
Layers
Action required to meet 
Risk Tolerance Criteria
Yes
1. System need to be installed with pressure transmitter
2. Low pressure alarm should be installed
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failure on SAV-04 Valve, fail to open shown on the figure 
below (Figure 40-41).  
 
Figure 40 Unmitigated Risk Matrix 
 
Figure 41 Mitigated Risk Matrix 
From the figure showing that risk level has been successfully 
mitigated because the risk level has reduce to low risk. For the 
other scenario has attached on Attachment II.  
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ATTACHMENT I 
 
1. Pipe Dimension 
2. LNG Specification 
3. Viking Grace General Arrangement 
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PIPE DIMENSION 
Pipe Material Size Pressure Class 
A1 Pipe 
Stainless 
Steel 
DN100/150 PN16 
B1 Pipe 
Stainless 
Steel 
DN100/150 PN16 
Pipe on Cool Box 
Stainless 
Steel 
DN100 PN40 
Pipe on GVU 
Stainless 
Steel 
DN100 PN40 
Gas system 
ventilation 
Stainless 
Steel 
DN50 PN40 
C1 Pipe 
Stainless 
Steel 
DN32 PN16 
D1 Pipe 
Stainless 
Steel 
G1” PN16 
E1 Pipe 
Stainless 
Steel 
G1/2” PN10 
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LIQEFIED NATURAL GAS 
 
CAUTIONARY RESPONSE INFORMATION 
FIRE 
Flammable 
 Flashback along vapor trail may occur. 
 May explode if ignited in an enclosed area. 
 Stop discharge if possible 
 Cool exposed area and men effecting shutoff with water. 
EXPOSURE 
Vapor 
 Not irritating to eyes, nose or throat. 
 If inhaled, will cause dizziness, difficult breathing or loss 
of consciousness. 
 If breathing is difficult, give oxygen. 
 If breathing has stopped, give artificial respiration. 
Liquid 
 Will cause frostbite. 
 Flush affected areas with plenty of water. 
WATER POLLUTION 
 No harmful to aquatic life. 
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HEALTH HAZARDS 
Personal protective equipment : 
Self-contained breathing apparatus; protective clothing if 
exposed to liquid. 
 
Symptoms following exposure : 
If concentration of gas is high enough, may cause 
asphyxiation.  No detectable systematic effects, even at 5% 
concentration in air. 
 
Treatment of exposure  : 
Remove victim to open air. If he/she is overcome by gas, 
apply artificial resuscitation. 
 
Vapor irritant characteristic : 
Vapors are nonirritating to the eyes and throat. 
 
Liquid characteristic  : 
No appreciable hazard. Practically harmless to the skin 
because it is very volatile and evaporates quickly. May cause 
some frostbite. 
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PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL PROPERTIES 
 
Physical state at 15oC; 1 atm Gas 
Molecular weight >16 
Boiling point at 1 atm -161oC 
Freezing point -182,2oC 
Critical temperature -82,2oC 
Critical pressure 45,78 atm 
Specific gravity 0,415-0,45 at 
-162oC 
Liquid surface tension 0,014 N/m at 
-161oC 
Vapor specific gravity 0,55-1 
Ratio of specific heats of vapor 1,306 
Latent heat of vaporization 5,1x105 J/kg 
Heat of combustion -502,4 to -
544,3 x 105 
J/kg 
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ATTACHMENT II 
 
1. Frequency analysis using FTA 
2. Consequence analysis using ALOHA 
3. HAZOP Analysis and risk evaluation result 
4. Mitigation 
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FREQUENCY ANALYSIS USING FTA 
 
110 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Failure on SAV-04 valve, fail to open (PBU 1.1.) 
A1: Loss of power 
A2: Delay 
A3: Fail to control valve 
B1: Breakdown 
B2: Fail to start on demand 
B3: Fail to synchronize 
B4: Low output 
B5: Spurious stop  
B6: Fail to open 
B7: Structural deficiency 
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Leakage (PBU 2.1.) 
A1: Pipe being rupture 
A2: External leakage on valve 
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Failure on SAV-04 fail to close (PBU 3.1.) 
A1: Loss of power 
A2: Delay 
A3: Fail to close o demand 
B1: Breakdown 
B2: Fail to start on demand 
B3: Fail to synchronize 
B4: Low output 
B5: Spurious stop  
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Failure on evaporate system (PBU 4.1.) 
A1: Failure on pump 
A2: Fail to regulate valve 
B1: Loss of power 
B2: Fail to start electric motor pump 
B3: Pump is broken 
C1: Breakdown 
C2: Fail to start on demand 
C3: Fail to synchronize 
C4: Low output 
C5: Spurious stop 
C6: Fail to start pump 
C7: Noise 
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Leakage (PBU 5.1.) 
A1: Pipe being rupture 
A2: External leakage on valve 
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Fail to monitor pressure on the tank (PBU 6.1.) 
A1: Failure on pressure sensor 
A2: Loss of power 
B1: Breakdown 
B2: Fail to start on demand 
B3: Fail to synchronize 
B4: Low output 
B5: Spurious stop 
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Failure on SAV-05 valve, fail to close (PBU 6.2.) 
A1: Loss of power 
A2: Internal leakage on valve 
A3: Delay 
A4: Fail to control valve 
B1: Breakdown 
B2: Fail to start on demand 
B3: Fail to synchronize 
B4: Low output 
B5: Spurious stop 
B6: Fail to close 
B7: Structural deficiency 
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Failure on SAV-06 valve, cannot open (CBX 1.1.) 
A1: Fail to regulate 
A2: Delay 
B1: Fail to open 
B2: Structural deficiency 
B3: Abnormal instrument reading 
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Failure on SAV-07 valve, cannot open (CBX 1.2.) 
A1: Fail to regulate 
A2: Delay 
B1: Fail to open 
B2: Structural deficiency 
B3: Abnormal instrument reading 
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Leakage (CBX2.1.) 
A1: Pipe being rupture 
A2: External leakage on valve 
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Failure on SAV-07 valve, fail to close (CBX 3.1.) 
A1: Fail to close on demand 
A2: Structural deficiency 
A3: Valve leakage in closed position 
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Failure on evaporate system (CBX 4.1.) 
A1: Failure on pump 
A2: Fail to regulate valve 
B1: Loss of power 
B2: Fail to start electric motor pump 
B3: Pump is broken 
C1: Breakdown 
C2: Fail to start on demand 
C3: Fail to synchronize 
C4: Low output 
C5: Spurious stop 
C6: Fail to start pump 
C7: Noise 
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Leakage (CBX 5.1.) 
A1: Pipe being rupture 
A2: External leakage on valve 
  
130 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Failure on SAV-07 valve, fail to close (CBX 6.1.) 
A1: Fail to close on demand 
A2: Structural deficiency 
A3: Valve leakage in closed position 
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Failure on pump (AXME 1.1.) 
A1: Loss of power 
A2: Electric motor pump broken 
A3: Fail on pump 
B1: Breakdown 
B2: Fail to start on demand 
B3: Fail to synchronize 
B4: Low output 
B5: Spurious stop 
B6: Fail to start on demand 
B7: Noise 
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Leakage (AXME 2.1.) 
A1: Pipe being rupture 
A2: External leakage on valve 
 
 
Failure on temperature sensors (AXME 3.1.) 
A1: Fail to function on demand 
A2: Spurious stop  
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Failure on pump (AXE 1.1.) 
A1: Loss of power 
A2: Electric motor pump broken 
A3: Fail on pump 
B1: Breakdown 
B2: Fail to start on demand 
B3: Fail to synchronize 
B4: Low output 
B5: Spurious stop 
B6: Fail to start on demand 
B7: Noise 
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Leakage (AXE 2.1.) 
A1: Pipe being rupture 
A2: External leakage on valve 
 
 
Failure on temperature sensors (AXE 3.1.) 
A1: Fail to function on demand 
A2: Spurious stop 
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Failure on VSO-01 valve, fail to open (GVU 1.1.) 
A1: Fail to regulate 
A2: Delay 
B1: Fail to open on demand 
B2: Structural deficiency 
B3: Abnormal instrument reading 
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Failure VB-01 and VB-02 valve, fail to open (GVU 1.2.) 
A1: Loss of power 
A2: Fail to regulate valve 
B1: Breakdown 
B2: Fail to start on demand 
B3: Fail to synchronize 
B4: Low output 
B5: Spurious stop 
B6: Fail to open on demand 
B7: Spurious stop 
B8: Structural deficiency 
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Failure on VG-01 valve, fail to open (GVU 1.3.) 
A1: Loss of power 
A2: Delay operation 
A3: Fail to regulate valve 
B1: Breakdown 
B2: Fail to start on demand 
B3: Fail to synchronize 
B4: Low output 
B5: Spurious stop 
B6: Fail to open on demand 
B7: Spurious stop 
B8: Structural deficiency 
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Leakage (GVU 2.1.) 
A1: Pipe being rupture 
A2: Leakage on valve 
A3: Leakage on filter 
B1: Leakage on VSO or VB valve 
B2: Leakage on VG valve 
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Failure on VG-01 valve, fail to regulate valve (GVU 2.2.) 
A1: Fail to regulate 
A2: Delay 
B1: Structural deficiency 
B2: Abnormal instrument reading 
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Failure on VSO-01 valve, fail to close (GVU 3.1.) 
A1: Fail to regulate 
A2: Delay 
B1: Fail to close on demand 
B2: Structural deficiency 
B3: Abnormal instrument reading 
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Failure on VG-01 Valve, fail to close (GVU 3.2.) 
A1: Loss of power 
A2: Fail to regulate 
B1: Breakdown 
B2: Fail to start on demand 
B3: Fail to synchronize 
B4: Low output 
B5: Spurious stop 
B6: Fail to close on demand 
B7: Spurious operation 
B8: Structural deficiency 
B9: valve leakage in closed position 
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Leakage (GVU 4.1.) 
A1: Pipe being rupture 
A2: Leakage on valve 
A3: Leakage on filter 
B1: Leakage on VSO or VB valve 
B2: Leakage on VG valve 
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Failure on VG-01 Valve, fail to close (GVU 5.1.) 
A1: Loss of power 
A2: Fail to regulate 
B1: Breakdown 
B2: Fail to start on demand 
B3: Fail to synchronize 
B4: Low output 
B5: Spurious stop 
B6: Fail to close on demand 
B7: Spurious operation 
B8: Structural deficiency 
B9: valve leakage in closed position 
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Failure on VSO-02 Valve, fail to open (PGVU 1.1.) 
A1: Fail to regulate 
A2: Delay 
B1: Fail to open on demand 
B2: Structural deficiency 
B3: Abnormal instrument reading 
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Leakage (PGVU 2.1.) 
A1: Pipe being rupture 
A2: Leakage on VSO valve 
A3: Leakage on filter 
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Failure on VSO-01 Valve, fail to close (PGVU 3.1.) 
A1: Fail to close on demand 
A2: Structural deficiency 
A3: Valve leakage in closed position  
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Failure on VV-01 or VV-02 valve, fail to open (PGVU 3.2.) 
A1: Loss of power 
A2: Delay operation 
A3: Fail to regulate valve 
B1: Breakdown 
B2: Fail to start on demand 
B3: Fail to synchronize 
B4: Low output 
B5: Spurious stop 
B6: Fail to open on demand 
B7: Spurious stop 
B8: Structural deficiency 
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Failure on gas admission valve, cannot flow LNG vapor (FGS 
1.1.) 
A1: Failure on actuating device 
A2: Failure on injection 
A3: Failure on control 
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Leakage (FGS 2.1.) 
A1: Pipe being rupture 
A2: Leakage on filter 
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Failure on gas admission valve, cannot flow LNG vapor (FGS 
2.1.) 
A1: Failure on actuating device 
A2: Failure on injection 
A3: Failure on control 
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Failure on gas admission valve, cannot flow LNG vapor (FGS 
3.1.) 
A1: Failure on actuating device 
A2: Failure on injection 
A3: Failure on control 
A4: Leakage 
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CONSEQUNECE ANALYSIS 
USING ALOHA 
 
1. Consequence analysis: Explosion on tank 
CHEMICAL DATA: 
o Chemical Name: METHANE 
o CAS Number: 74-82-8  
o Molecular Weight: 16.04 g/mol 
o PAC-1: 65000 ppm 
o PAC-2: 230000 ppm 
o PAC-3: 400000 ppm 
o LEL: 50000 ppm 
o UEL: 150000 ppm 
o Ambient Boiling Point: -258.7° F 
o Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1   
atm 
o Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 
100.0% 
 
 ATMOSPHERIC DATA: (MANUAL INPUT OF DATA)  
o Wind: 20 miles/hour from NNW at 3 meters 
o Ground Roughness: open water 
o Cloud Cover: 0 tenths 
o Air Temperature: 16° C 
o Stability Class: E 
o No Inversion Height 
o Relative Humidity: 75% 
 
 SOURCE STRENGTH: 
o BLEVE of flammable liquid in horizontal cylindrical tank 
o Tank Diameter: 4.3 meters 
o Tank Length: 13.8 meters 
o Tank Volume: 200 cubic meters 
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o Tank contains liquid                    
o Internal Storage Temperature: -161° C 
o Chemical Mass in Tank: 75,958 kilograms 
o Tank is 90% full 
o Internal Pressure at Failure: 20 atmospheres 
o Percentage of Tank Mass in Fireball: 100.0% 
o Fireball Diameter: 269 yards 
o Burn Duration: 15 seconds 
 
 THREAT ZONE:  
o Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from fireball 
o Red   : 622 yards --- (10.0 kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal 
within 60 sec) 
o Orange: 877 yards --- (5.0 kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree burns 
within 60 sec) 
o Yellow: 1366 yards --- (2.0 kW/(sq m) = pain within 60 
sec) 
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2. Consequence analysis: Explosion on Cool Box 
CHEMICAL DATA: 
o Chemical Name: METHANE 
o CAS Number: 74-82-8 
o Molecular Weight: 16.04 g/mol 
o PAC-1: 65000 ppm 
o PAC-2: 230000 ppm 
o PAC-3: 400000 ppm 
o LEL: 50000 ppm 
o UEL: 150000 ppm 
o Ambient Boiling Point: -258.7° F 
o Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 
atm 
o Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 
100.0% 
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 ATMOSPHERIC DATA: (MANUAL INPUT OF DATA)  
o Wind: 20 miles/hour from NNW at 3 meters 
o Ground Roughness: open water 
o Cloud Cover: 0 tenths 
o Air Temperature: 16° C 
o Stability Class: E 
o No Inversion Height 
o Relative Humidity: 75% 
 
 SOURCE STRENGTH: 
o Leak from short pipe or valve in horizontal cylindrical 
tank  
o Flammable chemical escaping from tank (not burning) 
o Tank Diameter: 4.3 meters 
o Tank Length: 13.8 meters 
o Tank Volume: 200 cubic meters 
o Tank contains liquid 
o Internal Temperature: -161° C 
o Chemical Mass in Tank: 75,958 kilograms 
o Tank is 90% full 
o Circular Opening Diameter: 11.43 centimeters 
o Opening is 4.00 meters from tank bottom 
o Release Duration: 49 minutes 
o Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 1,340 pounds/min 
      (averaged over a minute or more) 
o Total Amount Released: 44,656 pounds 
Note: The chemical escaped as a mixture of gas and 
aerosol (two phase flow). 
 
 THREAT ZONE:  
o Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) from vapor 
cloud explosion 
o Type of Ignition: ignited by spark or flame 
165 
 
 
 
o Level of Congestion: congested 
o Model Run: Heavy Gas 
o Red   : LOC was never exceeded --- (8.0 psi = destruction 
of buildings) 
o Orange: LOC was never exceeded --- (3.5 psi = serious 
injury likely) 
o Yellow: 89 yards --- (1.0 psi = shatters glass) 
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3. Consequence analysis: Leakage on Cool Box-GVU 
pipe (outdoor) 
CHEMICAL DATA: 
o Chemical Name: METHANE 
o CAS Number: 74-82-8 
o Molecular Weight: 16.04 g/mol 
o PAC-1: 65000 ppm 
o PAC-2: 230000 ppm 
o PAC-3: 400000 ppm 
o LEL: 50000 ppm 
o UEL: 150000 ppm 
o Ambient Boiling Point: -258.7° F 
o Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 
atm 
o Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 
100.0% 
 
 ATMOSPHERIC DATA: (MANUAL INPUT OF DATA)  
o Wind: 20 miles/hour from NNW at 3 meters 
o Ground Roughness: open water 
o Cloud Cover: 0 tenths 
o Air Temperature: 16° C 
o Stability Class: E 
o No Inversion Height 
o Relative Humidity: 75% 
 
 SOURCE STRENGTH: 
o Flammable gas escaping from pipe (not burning) 
o Pipe Diameter: 11.43 centimeters 
o Pipe Length: 66 meters 
o Unbroken end of the pipe is connected to an infinite 
source 
o Pipe Roughness: smooth 
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o Hole Area: 103 sq cm 
o Pipe Press: 592000 pascals 
o Pipe Temperature: 60° C 
o Release Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour 
o Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 488 pounds/min 
      (averaged over a minute or more)  
o Total Amount Released: 29,243 pounds 
 
 THREAT ZONE:  
o Threat Modeled: Flammable Area of Vapor Cloud 
o Model Run: Gaussian 
o Red   : 94 yards --- (30000 ppm = 60% LEL = Flame 
Pockets) 
o Yellow: 234 yards --- (5000 ppm = 10% LEL) 
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4. Consequence analysis: Explosion on GVU 
CHEMICAL DATA: 
o Chemical Name: METHANE 
o CAS Number: 74-82-8 
o  Molecular Weight: 16.04 g/mol 
o PAC-1: 65000 ppm 
o PAC-2: 230000 ppm 
o PAC-3: 400000 ppm 
o LEL: 50000 ppm 
o UEL: 150000 ppm 
o Ambient Boiling Point: -258.7° F 
o Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 
atm 
o Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 
100.0% 
 
 ATMOSPHERIC DATA: (MANUAL INPUT OF DATA)  
o Wind: 20 miles/hour from nnw at 3 meters 
o Ground Roughness: open water 
o Cloud Cover: 0 tenths 
o Air Temperature: 16° C  
o Stability Class: E 
o No Inversion Height 
o Relative Humidity: 75% 
 
 SOURCE STRENGTH: 
o Leak from short pipe or valve in horizontal cylindrical 
tank  
o Flammable chemical escaping from tank (not burning) 
o Tank Diameter: 3.2 meters 
o Tank Length: 2.71 meters 
o Tank Volume: 21.8 cubic meters 
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o Tank contains gas only 
o Internal Temperature: 0° C 
o Chemical Mass in Tank: 0.28 tons 
o Internal Press: 1600000 pascals 
o Circular Opening Diameter: 11.43 centimeters 
o Release Duration: 1 minute 
o Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 8.47 pounds/sec 
      (averaged over a minute or more)  
o Total Amount Released: 508 pounds 
 
 THREAT ZONE:  
o Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) from vapor 
cloud explosion 
o Type of Ignition: ignited by spark or flame 
o Level of Congestion: congested 
o Model Run: Gaussian 
o Red   : LOC was never exceeded --- (8.0 psi = destruction 
of buildings) 
o Orange: LOC was never exceeded --- (3.5 psi = serious 
injury likely) 
o Yellow: 68 yards --- (1.0 psi = shatters glass) 
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5. Consequence analysis: Leakage on GVU-ME pipe 
CHEMICAL DATA: 
o Chemical Name: METHANE 
o CAS Number: 74-82-8 
o Molecular Weight: 16.04 g/mol 
o PAC-1: 65000 ppm 
o PAC-2: 230000 ppm 
o PAC-3: 400000 ppm 
o LEL: 50000 ppm 
o UEL: 150000 ppm 
o Ambient Boiling Point: -258.7° F 
o Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 
atm 
o Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 
100.0% 
 
 ATMOSPHERIC DATA: (MANUAL INPUT OF DATA)  
o Wind: 20 miles/hour from nnw at 3 meters 
o Ground Roughness: open water 
o Cloud Cover: 0 tenths 
o Air Temperature: 16° C 
o Stability Class: E 
o No Inversion Height 
o Relative Humidity: 75% 
 
 SOURCE STRENGTH: 
o Flammable gas escaping from pipe (not burning) 
o Pipe Diameter: 11.43 centimeters       Pipe Length: 23 
meters 
o Unbroken end of the pipe is connected to an infinite 
source 
o Pipe Roughness: smooth 
o Hole Area: 103 sq cm 
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o Pipe Press: 472000 pascals 
o Pipe Temperature: 0° C 
o Release Duration: ALOHA limited the duration to 1 hour 
o Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 606 pounds/min 
(averaged over a minute or more)  
o Total Amount Released: 36,361 pounds 
 
 THREAT ZONE:  
o Model Run: Gaussian 
o Red   : 20 yards --- (400000 ppm = PAC-3) 
o Orange: 26 yards --- (230000 ppm = PAC-2) 
o Yellow: 50 yards --- (65000 ppm = PAC-1) 
Note: Threat zone was not drawn because effects of near-
field patchiness make dispersion predictions less reliable 
for short distances. 
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MITIGATION 
LOPA WORKSHEET 
 
 
  
Scenario No. 1 Node No. 1
Date: 20 June 2016 Description Probability
Frequency 
(per year)
Consequence 
description/ Category
Operation of dual fuel system will 
be delayed/ 4
Risk Tolerance Criteria Action required >10-4
Tolerable <10-4
Initiating event
Failure on SAV-04 Valve, fail to 
open
2.62 x 10-3
Frequency of 
Unmitigated 
Consequence
2.62 x 10-3
Pressure transmitter 6.55 x 10-6
Low pressure alarm 5.01 x 10-3
Total PFD 3.28 x 10-8
Frequency of Mitigated 
Consequence
8.59 x 10-11
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
Met? (Yes/ No)
No LNG transfer to tank caused by failure on SAV-04 
Valve, fail to open
Independent Protection 
Layers
Action required to meet 
Risk Tolerance Criteria
Yes
1. System need to be installed with pressure transmitter
2. Low pressure alarm should be installed
184 
 
 
 
 
  
Scenario No. 2 Node No. 1
Date: 20 June 2016 Description Probability
Frequency 
(per year)
Consequence 
description/ Category
Excessive flow to the tank will 
increase tank pressure, if the 
pressure in tha tank more than 20 
bar could inflict explosion/ 5
Risk Tolerance Criteria Action required >10-5
Tolerable <10-5
Initiating event
Failure on SAV-04 valve, fail to 
close
2.63 x 10-3
Frequency of 
Unmitigated 
Consequence
2.63 x 10-3
Pressure safety valve 1.93 x 10-6
Gas detector 5.66 x 10-6
Exchange fan 5.39 x 10-3
Total PFD 5.88 x 10-14
Frequency of Mitigated 
Consequence
1.54 x 10-16
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
Met? (Yes/ No)
More LNG transfer to tank caused by failure on SAV-
04 valve, fail to close
Independent Protection 
Layers
Yes
Action required to meet 
Risk Tolerance Criteria
1. System need to be installed with pressure safety valve
2. Gas detector should be installed independent
3. There are should be exchange fan for each cool box
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Scenario No. 3 Node No. 1
Date: 20 June 2016 Description Probability
Frequency 
(per year)
Consequence 
description/ Category
Operation will be delayed because 
not enough pressure to transfering 
LNG to GVU/ 4
Risk Tolerance Criteria Action required >10-4
Tolerable <10-4
Initiating event Failure on evaporate system 2.62 x 10-3
Frequency of 
Unmitigated 
Consequence
2.62 x 10-3
Flow sensor 4.4 x 10-6
Pressure transmitter 6.55 x 10-6
Low pressure alarm 5.01 x 10-3
Total PFD 1.44 x 10-13
Frequency of Mitigated 
Consequence
3.78 x 10-16
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
Met? (Yes/ No)
Cannot evaporate LNG caused by failure on 
evaporate system
Independent Protection 
Layers
Yes
Action required to meet 
Risk Tolerance Criteria
1. System need to be installed with flow sensor
2. System need to be installed with pressure transmitter
3. Low pressure alarm should be installed
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Scenario No. 4 Node No. 1
Date: 20 June 2016 Description Probability
Frequency 
(per year)
Consequence 
description/ Category
Excessive pressure on the tank and 
very potential to be an explosion/ 
5
Risk Tolerance Criteria Action required >10-5
Tolerable <10-5
Initiating event
Fail to monitor pressure on the 
tank
2.6 x 10-3
Frequency of 
Unmitigated 
Consequence
2.6 x 10-3
Pressure safety valve 1.93 x 10-6
Gas detector 5.66 x 10-6
Exchange fan 5.39 x 10-3
Total PFD 5.88 x 10-14
Frequency of Mitigated 
Consequence
1.53 x 10-16
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
Met? (Yes/ No)
More LNG vapor which will be transferred to the 
tank caused by fail to monitor pressure on the tank
Independent Protection 
Layers
Yes
Action required to meet 
Risk Tolerance Criteria
1. System need to be installed with pressure safety valve
2. Gas detector should be installed independent
3. There are should be exchange fan for each cool box
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Scenario No. 5 Node No. 1
Date: 20 June 2016 Description Probability
Frequency 
(per year)
Consequence 
description/ Category
Excessive pressure on the tank and 
very potential to be an explosion/ 
5
Risk Tolerance Criteria Action required >10-5
Tolerable <10-5
Initiating event
Failure on SAV-05 valve, fail to 
close
2.6 x 10-3
Frequency of 
Unmitigated 
Consequence
2.6 x 10-3
Pressure safety valve 1.93 x 10-6
Gas detector 5.66 x 10-6
Exchange fan 5.39 x 10-3
Total PFD 5.88 x 10-14
Frequency of Mitigated 
Consequence
1.53 x 10-16
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
Met? (Yes/ No)
More LNG vapor which will be transferred to the 
tank caused by failure on SAV-05 valve, fail to close
Independent Protection 
Layers
Yes
Action required to meet 
Risk Tolerance Criteria
1. System need to be installed with pressure safety valve
2. Gas detector should be installed independent
3. There are should be exchange fan for each cool box
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Scenario No. 1 Node No. 2
Date: 20 June 2016 Description Probability
Frequency 
(per year)
Consequence 
description/ Category
Operation of dual fuel system will 
be delayed/ 4
Risk Tolerance Criteria Action required >10-4
Tolerable <10-4
Initiating event
Failure on SAV-04 Valve, fail to 
open
2.6 x 10-3
Frequency of 
Unmitigated 
Consequence
2.6 x 10-3
Flow sensor 4.4 x 10-6
Pressure transmitter 6.55 x 10-6
Low pressure alarm 5.01 x 10-3
Total PFD 1.44 x 10-13
Frequency of Mitigated 
Consequence
3.74 x 10-16
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
Met? (Yes/ No)
No LNG transfer to tank caused by failure on SAV-04 
Valve, fail to open
Independent Protection 
Layers
Yes
Action required to meet 
Risk Tolerance Criteria
1. System need to be installed with flow sensor
2. System need to be installed with pressure transmitter
3. Low pressure alarm should be installed
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Scenario No. 1 Node No. 3
Date: 21 June 2016 Description Probability
Frequency 
(per year)
Consequence 
description/ Category
Operation of dual fuel system will 
be delayed/ 4
Risk Tolerance Criteria Action required >10-4
Tolerable <10-4
Initiating event Failure on pump 2.6 x 10-3
Frequency of 
Unmitigated 
Consequence
2.6 x 10-3
Flow sensor 4.4 x 10-6
Emergency genset 5.94 x 10-3
Low pressure alarm 5.01 x 10-3
Total PFD 1.44 x 10-13
Frequency of Mitigated 
Consequence
1.3 x 10-10
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
Met? (Yes/ No)
No glycol water transfer from PBE-01 to MGE-01 
caused by failure on pump
Independent Protection 
Layers
Yes
Action required to meet 
Risk Tolerance Criteria
1. System need to be installed with flow sensor
2.The power for pumps are need to be supplyed by emergency 
electric generator
3. Low pressure alarm should be installed
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Scenario No. 1 Node No. 4
Date: 21 June 2016 Description Probability
Frequency 
(per year)
Consequence 
description/ Category
Operation of dual fuel system will 
be delayed/ 4
Risk Tolerance Criteria Action required >10-4
Tolerable <10-4
Initiating event Failure on pump 2.6 x 10-3
Frequency of 
Unmitigated 
Consequence
2.6 x 10-3
Flow sensor 4.4 x 10-6
Emergency genset 5.94 x 10-3
Low pressure alarm 5.01 x 10-3
Total PFD 1.44 x 10-13
Frequency of Mitigated 
Consequence
1.3 x 10-10
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
Met? (Yes/ No)
No glycol water transfer from PBE-01 to MGE-01 
caused by failure on pump
Independent Protection 
Layers
Yes
Action required to meet 
Risk Tolerance Criteria
1. System need to be installed with flow sensor
2.The power for pumps are need to be supplyed by emergency 
electric generator
3. Low pressure alarm should be installed
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Scenario No. 1 Node No. 5
Date: 21 June 2016 Description Probability
Frequency 
(per year)
Consequence 
description/ Category
Operating of dual fuel system will 
be deayed and excessive pressure 
on GVU room could generate an 
explosion/ 5
Risk Tolerance Criteria Action required >10-5
Tolerable <10-5
Initiating event
Failure VB-01 and VB-02 valve, fail 
to open
2.6 x 10-3
Frequency of 
Unmitigated 
Consequence
2.6 x 10-3
Pressure transmitter 6.55 x 10-6
High pressure alarm 3.13 x 10-3
Pressure safety valve 1.93 x 10-6
Total PFD 3.95 x 10-14
Frequency of Mitigated 
Consequence
1.027 x 10-16
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
Met? (Yes/ No)
No LNG vapor transfer caused by failure VB-01 and 
VB-02 valve, fail to open
Independent Protection 
Layers
Yes
Action required to meet 
Risk Tolerance Criteria
1. System need to be installed with pressure transmitter
2. High pressure alarm should be installed
1. System need to be installed with pressure safety valve
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Scenario No. 2 Node No. 5
Date: 21 June 2016 Description Probability
Frequency 
(per year)
Consequence 
description/ Category
Operating of dual fuel system will 
be deayed/ 4
Risk Tolerance Criteria Action required >10-4
Tolerable <10-4
Initiating event Failure on VG-01 valve, fail to open 2.6 x 10-3
Frequency of 
Unmitigated 
Consequence
2.6 x 10-3
Pressure transmitter 6.55 x 10-6
High pressure alarm 3.13 x 10-3
Pressure safety valve 1.93 x 10-6
Total PFD 3.95 x 10-14
Frequency of Mitigated 
Consequence
1.027 x 10-16
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
Met? (Yes/ No)
No LNG vapor transfer caused by failure on VG-01 
valve, fail to open 
Independent Protection 
Layers
Yes
Action required to meet 
Risk Tolerance Criteria
1. System need to be installed with pressure transmitter
2. High pressure alarm should be installed
3. System need to be installed with pressure safety valve
193 
 
 
 
 
  
Scenario No. 3 Node No. 5
Date: 21 June 2016 Description Probability
Frequency 
(per year)
Consequence 
description/ Category
Operating of dual fuel system will 
be degraded/ 3
Risk Tolerance Criteria Action required >10-4
Tolerable <10-4
Initiating event
 Failure on VG-01 valve, fail to 
close
2.6 x 10-3
Frequency of 
Unmitigated 
Consequence
2.6 x 10-3
Pressure transmitter 6.55 x 10-6
High pressure alarm 3.13 x 10-3
Pressure safety valve 1.93 x 10-6
Total PFD 3.95 x 10-14
Frequency of Mitigated 
Consequence
1.027 x 10-16
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
Met? (Yes/ No)
More LNG vapor transfer caused by failure on VG-01 
valve, fail to close
Independent Protection 
Layers
Yes
Action required to meet 
Risk Tolerance Criteria
1. System need to be installed with pressure transmitter
2. High pressure alarm should be installed
3. System need to be installed with pressure safety valve
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Scenario No. 4 Node No. 5
Date: 21 June 2016 Description Probability
Frequency 
(per year)
Consequence 
description/ Category
Operating of dual fuel system will 
be degraded/ 3
Risk Tolerance Criteria Action required >10-4
Tolerable <10-4
Initiating event Leakage 2.6 x 10-3
Frequency of 
Unmitigated 
Consequence
2.6 x 10-3
Pressure transmitter 6.55 x 10-6
Gas detector 5.66 x 10-6
Exchange fan 5.39 x 10-3
Total PFD 1.99 x 10-13
Frequency of Mitigated 
Consequence
7.56 x 10-16
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
Met? (Yes/ No)
Less LNG vapor pressure caused by leakage
Independent Protection 
Layers
Yes
Action required to meet 
Risk Tolerance Criteria
1. System need to be installed with pressure transmitter
2. Gas detector should be installed independent
3. There are should be exchange fan for each cool box
195 
 
 
 
 
  
Scenario No. 5 Node No. 5
Date: 21 June 2016 Description Probability
Frequency 
(per year)
Consequence 
description/ Category
Degrading engine performance. 
Could generate pipe leaks or 
explosion if pressure more than 16 
bar/ 3
Risk Tolerance Criteria Action required >10-4
Tolerable <10-4
Initiating event Failure on VG-01 Valve, fail to close 2.6 x 10-3
Frequency of 
Unmitigated 
Consequence
2.6 x 10-3
Pressure transmitter 6.55 x 10-6
Pressure safety valve 1.93 x 10-6
Gas detector 5.66 x 10-6
Exchange fan 5.39 x 10-3
Total PFD 1.99 x 10-13
Frequency of Mitigated 
Consequence
1.46 x 10-21
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
Met? (Yes/ No)
More LNG vapor pressure caused by failure on VG-
01 Valve, fail to close
Independent Protection 
Layers
Yes
Action required to meet 
Risk Tolerance Criteria
1. System need to be installed with pressure transmitter
2. System need to be installed with pressure safety valve
3. Gas detector should be installed independent
4. There are should be exchange fan for each cool box
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Scenario No. 1 Node No. 6
Date: 21 June 2016 Description Probability
Frequency 
(per year)
Consequence 
description/ Category
Excessive pressure on GVU pipe 
and could inflict explosion/ 5
Risk Tolerance Criteria Action required >10-5
Tolerable <10-5
Initiating event
Failure on VSO-01 Valve, fail to 
close
2.57 x 10-5
Frequency of 
Unmitigated 
Consequence
2.57 x 10-5
Pressure transmitter 6.55 x 10-6
Pressure safety valve 1.93 x 10-6
Gas detector 5.66 x 10-6
Exchange fan 5.39 x 10-3
Total PFD 1.99 x 10-13
Frequency of Mitigated 
Consequence
5.1 x 10-18
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
Met? (Yes/ No)
There are still LNG vapor on GVU when emergency 
condition caused by failure on VSO-01 Valve, fail to 
close
Independent Protection 
Layers
Yes
Action required to meet 
Risk Tolerance Criteria
1. System need to be installed with pressure transmitter
2. System need to be installed with pressure safety valve
3. Gas detector should be installed independent
4. There are should be exchange fan for each cool box
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Scenario No. 2 Node No. 6
Date: 21 June 2016 Description Probability
Frequency 
(per year)
Consequence 
description/ Category
LNG vapor trap on GVU system and 
will be delayed dual fuel 
operation/ 4
Risk Tolerance Criteria Action required >10-4
Tolerable <10-4
Initiating event
Failure on VV-01 or VV-02 valve, 
fail to open
2.6 x 10-3
Frequency of 
Unmitigated 
Consequence
2.6 x 10-3
Pressure transmitter 6.55 x 10-6
Pressure safety valve 1.93 x 10-6
Gas detector 5.66 x 10-6
Exchange fan 5.39 x 10-3
Total PFD 1.99 x 10-13
Frequency of Mitigated 
Consequence
1.46 x 10-21
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
Met? (Yes/ No)
There are still LNG vapor on GVU when emergency 
condition caused by failure on VV-01 or VV-02 valve, 
fail to open
Independent Protection 
Layers
Yes
Action required to meet 
Risk Tolerance Criteria
1. System need to be installed with pressure transmitter
2. System need to be installed with pressure safety valve
3. Gas detector should be installed independent
4. There are should be exchange fan for each cool box
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Scenario No. 1 Node No. 7
Date: 21 June 2016 Description Probability
Frequency 
(per year)
Consequence 
description/ Category
Operating of dual fuel system will 
be deayed/ 4
Risk Tolerance Criteria Action required >10-4
Tolerable <10-4
Initiating event Failure on gas admision valve 4.68 x 10-2
Frequency of 
Unmitigated 
Consequence
4.68 x 10-2
Pressure transmitter 6.55 x 10-6
Low pressure alarm 5.01 x 10-3
Total PFD 3.28 x 10-8
Frequency of Mitigated 
Consequence
1.53 x 10-9
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
Met? (Yes/ No)
There are no LNG vapor flow to engine cylinder 
caused by failure on gas admision valve
Independent Protection 
Layers
Yes
Action required to meet 
Risk Tolerance Criteria
1. System need to be installed with pressure transmitter
2. Low pressure alarm should be installed
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Scenario No. 2 Node No. 7
Date: 21 June 2016 Description Probability
Frequency 
(per year)
Consequence 
description/ Category
Operating of dual fuel system will 
be degraded/ 3
Risk Tolerance Criteria Action required >10-4
Tolerable <10-4
Initiating event Leakage 3.8 x 10-3
Frequency of 
Unmitigated 
Consequence
3.8 x 10-3
Vent valve 2.52 x 10-5
Gas detector 5.66 x 10-6
Exchange fan 5.39 x 10-3
Total PFD 7.68 x 10-13
Frequency of Mitigated 
Consequence
2.92 x 10-15
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
Met? (Yes/ No)
Less amount of LNG vapor that going to cylinder 
caused by leakage
Independent Protection 
Layers
Yes
Action required to meet 
Risk Tolerance Criteria
1. System need to be installed with vent valve
2. Gas detector should be installed independent
3. There are should be exchange fan for each cool box
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Scenario No. 3 Node No. 7
Date: 21 June 2016 Description Probability
Frequency 
(per year)
Consequence 
description/ Category
Operating of dual fuel system will 
be degraded/ 3
Risk Tolerance Criteria Action required >10-4
Tolerable <10-4
Initiating event Failure on gas admision valve 4.68 x 10-2
Frequency of 
Unmitigated 
Consequence
4.68 x 10-2
Pressure transmitter 6.55 x 10-6
Total PFD 6.55 x 10-6
Frequency of Mitigated 
Consequence
3.06 x 10-7
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
Met? (Yes/ No)
Less amount of LNG vapor that going to cylinder 
caused by failure on gas admision valve
Independent Protection 
Layers
Yes
Action required to meet 
Risk Tolerance Criteria
1. System need to be installed with pressure transmitter
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Scenario No. 4 Node No. 7
Date: 21 June 2016 Description Probability
Frequency 
(per year)
Consequence 
description/ Category
Operating of dual fuel system will 
be degraded, engine knocking/ 3
Risk Tolerance Criteria Action required >10-4
Tolerable <10-4
Initiating event Failure on gas admision valve 1.18 x 10-1
Frequency of 
Unmitigated 
Consequence
1.18 x 10-1
High pressure alarm 3.13 x 10-3
Pressure safety valve 1.93 x 10-6
Gas detector 5.66 x 10-6
Exchange fan 5.39 x 10-3
Total PFD 1.84 x 10-16
Frequency of Mitigated 
Consequence
2.17 x 10-17
Risk Tolerance Criteria 
Met? (Yes/ No)
Excessive pressure on LNG vapor which going to 
cylnder caused by failure on gas admision valve
Independent Protection 
Layers
Yes
Action required to meet 
Risk Tolerance Criteria
1. High pressure alarm should be installed
2. System need to be installed with pressure safety valve
3. Gas detector should be installed independent
4. There are should be exchange fan for each cool box
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
Using a LNG as a fuel on ship has many benefit, such as in 
economic factor and environmental factor, but there are some 
points to be consider in terms of safety. Based on the result of 
risk assessment for dual fuel engine on ferry ship, concluded 
that: 
1. From 41 failure mode scenarios there are 18 failure mode 
which has moderate risk level and 1 failure mode on high 
risk level, rest of failure mode scenario has low risk level. 
Risk which is on moderate risk level and high risk level 
are need to mitigate. 
 
2. Several risk which generated in dual fuel system has a 
severity of LNG tank BLEVE, these risk had been 
mitigated using LOPA method by adding several items to 
reduce the value of frequency. 
 
3. Highest risk level on those scenario is failure mode of “No 
flow of LNG vapor to engine cylinder caused by failure on 
gas admission valve”. The mitigation for this scenario had 
reach the low risk level by adding pressure transmitter and 
low pressure alarm to prevent the consequence and reduce 
the frequency. 
 
4. There are two option of LNG tank location on the, above 
or below the deck. Due to several reason, such as requires 
zoned and explosion consequence, location LNG tank 
above the deck more recommended than below the deck.  
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5. Ferry ship which is use a conventional diesel engine and 
want to modified their engine to dual fuel engine are need 
to install several items on the engine, such as dual needle 
injection valve, control unit, gas admission valve and gas 
rail pipe, and need adding Gas Valve Unit (GVU) for each 
engine and LNG tank. 
 
6. Using a double pipe for gas fuel system very 
recommended to prevent gas leak.  
 
7. GVU need to be located on enclosure area, different area 
with main engine.  The GVU room must be fulfilled with 
independent gas detector and exchange fan for each room. 
 
8. Independent gas detector required for each main engine, 
GVU and Cool Box. 
 
9. There are two option on the Cool Box for transferring 
LNG from LNG tank to GVU which are by using pump or 
Pressure Build-up Evaporator (PBE). Using PBE more 
recommended than pump because of reliable and safety 
factor. 
 
10. All items which need a power supply, such as solenoid 
valve, motor pump, motor fan, gas detector and alarm, 
must be connected to the emergency power supply. 
 
11. Due to several risk with high consequence category, then 
the operational of dual fuel must always monitored, to 
support the monitoring activity a good and reliable items 
are needed. There for the activity of inspection and 
maintenance for those items are need to be done 
periodically.   
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